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WUHAN* S CONCEPT OF AN IMPERSONAL GOD
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
A. Problem.
The problem of this thesis is to determine and evaluate
Henry Nelson Wieman's concept of an impersonal God. This study
has not been undertaken with the expectation of finding one man*s
view of God to be adequate, complete, and satisfying. It is
doubtful if all the combined views of philosophers (if they could
be combined) would be adequate to give us even a very small frac-
tion of knowledge of what God really is. Only by the persistent
attempt to find something better than that which has been found
before do we arrive at any knowledge. Therefore, one man’s attempts
at finding the truth will add to our conception. Such a concept
as Wieman’s has not been widely held. For this reason, we may
find something new in what he has to tell us. It may be that his
view is a higher synthesis than any we have yet found; it may not
be. In the study of what his view is we shall try to discover
what his concept has to offer and to ascertain the contribution
which he has to make to a furtherance of our knowledge of God.
We shall first study what his concept is, and then evaluate its
contribution as a comprehensive and coherent account of the na-
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ture of God. We shall see if it helps to solve philosophical
problems or raises more of them.
It is Wi email* s chief concern to show what God is rather
than that he is. That, too, must he the attitude held in this the-
sis. The lack of a satisfactory conception of God has led many
people to say that there is no God. Religious experience, however,
has been too actual to be denied. Therefore, man has tried to dis-
cover what the reality is back of this very real experience. Per-
haps we may not by searching find out God; but shall we find him
more readily by not searching? We are therefore making the at-
tempt to start the search by concentrating on one philosopher’s
view to see if it meets the scientific and religious tests of
truth in so far as human minds are able to know the truth.
B. Data and Methods.
The primary sources are all the works of Wieman relevant to
the problem. These include most of Wieman*s published articles
and his four books: Religious Experience and Scientific Method
(1926), Methods of Private Religious Living (1927), The Wrestle
of Religion with Truth (1927), and The Issues of Life (1930),
Some of the earlier articles which have later been used in Wie-
man* s books are omitted from the bibliography. Where a change in
point of view is expressed, the writer aims to give Wieman*
s
latest conception. Some of Wieman* s articles which do not per-
tain to the problem and a number of reviews of his books which
..
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supply no additional information are also omitted from the bib-
liography.
The secondary data comprise works by other authors on the
same and related subjects. These works have been read in order
to obtain a better foundation for the evaluation of Wieman’s
works. They show what other philosophers are thinking on the sub-
ject, and therefore offer interesting and valuable contrast to or
agreement with Wieman. They also help to show wherein Wieman’s
view presents problems and to what extent it helps in solving them,
A presentation of Wieman’ s view is given in chapters II - V.
In these chapters the writer does not attempt to criticize, but
tries simply to reproduce Wieman’ s thought. The organization of
this treatment of Wieman’ s conception does not follow any outline
given by him. The writer believes, however, that the essence of
Wieman’ s idea is presented, but the writer must be held responsible
for the grouping and arrangement. The chapters are organized ac-
cording to problems, each chapter being of equal importance in pre-
senting a part of Wieman’s thought. The summary of his total con-
ception is given as carefully and impartially as possible.
Chapter VI presents the writer’s evaluation of Wieman’s con-
ception. In this chapter the writer attempts to show wherein Wie-
man’s idea of God meets the scientific and religious tests of truth
and wherein it does not; wherein problems are solved or raised; how
the idea fits in with a view of the whole of reality, or how it does
not. The writer seeks as far as possible to test the validity of
Wieman’s thought.
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Chapter II
1
THE TESTS OF RELIGIOUS TRUTH
The variety of religions testifies to the fact that religions
belief is uncertain. There may he specific saving qualities in all
forms of religions, hut unless the world is one vast confusion these
beliefs cannot all he equally true. There can he no doubt that the
adherents of these various religions have experienced something which
to them is very real. If the reality which they have experienced is
one, how does it happen that there are so many interpretations of
that reality? How can we decide what religious truth is? Religious
experience is experience of something, regardless of how much that
something has been misinterpreted and misunderstood. In order to
preserve the character of our religion we must have a more thorough
understanding of the vision and energy derived from religious expe-
rience. To understand as far as possible the nature of religious
truth, our beliefs should be given to tests. These tests cannot to-
tally be separated from each other for either one is invalid without
the other. We may test our beliefs by religious experience, but both
will have to be tested further by scientific method. Religious expe-
rience, being the basis of religious belief, is considered first.
^ In chapters II - V the writer seeks merely to present Pro-
fessor Wieman’s view. The presentation may include some of the writ-
er’s interpretation, but as nearly as possible the discussion is giv-
en from the point of view of Mr. Wieman. The writer’s comments are
given in footnotes.
,-
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A* Religious Experience.
Religious experience gives us the data through which we may
know God. However, religious experience is not sufficient to give
us knowledge of God. We do not obtain knowledge through immediate
experience, hut through interpretation of that experience. Reli-
gious experience is immediate acquaintance with God. Knowledge
should not he identified with immediate experience.
The experience of God is experience of something which is ex-
ternal to the individual. God must he experienced in the same way
as trees or flowers or persons or anything which we know. There is
no special organ through which one learns to know God. "If He he
not and object of sense experience. He cannot he scientifically
known." * Scientific knowledge is acquired through a careful study
of the data which come to us through sense experience. Knowledge of
God must he acquired in the same way. There is, however, a differ-
ence in the sel ectiveness by which we recognize the data of nonreli-
2gious experience and religious experience. In nonreligious expe-
rience we select only the data by which we recognize a certain en-
tity. We have formed habits of excluding a large part of the data
pertaining to the object which we wish to recognize. For instance,
* RE5M, 28. (Abbreviations in capital letters refer to books,
and are given in the bibliography with the name of the book.
Throughout this thesis, where no name is given in the footnotes,
the quotation is from Wieman.
2
Further illustration and explanation of the religious expe-
rience will be found in chapter IV of this thesis. See pages 20-27,
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6in looking at a stone we have experience of light which also in-
cludes experience of the sun; we have experience of the earth’s
gravitation and its relation to all other bodies, and many other
experiences too numerous to mention. However, we exclude all of
those greater experiences and interpret only the grayness, hard-
ness, shape, and position of the stone. These habits of exclud-
ing vast experiences enable us to recognize the small things with
which we deal in our daily lives.
In religious experience there cannot be this exclusion of
data for everything in the universe pertains in some measure to
God and enters into the experience of him. In a religious expe-
rience the habits by which we select specific data are broken down
and one is aware only of a totality of experience. There is aware-
ness of a vast, undefinable unity of experience. One’s attention
becomes diffusive instead of being focused on certain objects and
one becomes aware of the ’’movement of total experience.” * There
is no definition or recognized conception in the experience. One
2
experiences a state of ”diffusive awareness” in which the habit-
ual systems of response are broken down and there is somehow an ex-
perience of the unity of all things. Such experience is usually
followed by a sense of inexpressible peace.
There is untold value in an experience of this kind. It is
that which enables one to throw off one’s habitual attitudes and
responses and start life anew. Such an experience, which is really
1 BESM, 38.
2 Ibid., 39
—V
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7a deeper form of worship, will transform life. It does so by
changing and transforming one's established wants. The old habits
are broken up, because in this experience there is no integrated
system of response. ^ The old habits are broken down and it is
thus possible to form new ones. The person is then able to trans-
form his wants and to build his life upon a new system of desires.
"It is plain that the breaking down of habitual attitudes and the
release of free impulses in that diffusive stimulation of the total
personality, which occurs in religious experience as we have de-
scribed it is precisely the condition in which new habits can be
formed and the impulsive resources of the individual organized a-
2
bout certain dominant wants." The individual then rises out of
the experience, a new self with new impulses and a new outlook on
life.
The test of religious experience is the test of its value
for life. A real religious experience will enable one to grow in-
to a more abundant life by discarding the old self from time to
time. The individual must occasionally escape from himself in
this experience of God; he must then come back to himself, a great-
er and richer person for having had this experience of God.
Back of this experience is the reality which can give the
self a new and more valuable life. That reality is truth. If we
have experienced the something which has this transforming power,
we have experienced truth. Thus, the transforming power of reli-
gious experience is a test of truth.
1 See WET, 154
2 EESM, 218.
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8B. Scientific Method*
Although religious experience is a test of truth, this expe-
rience as well as any other must he tested hy scientific method.
Immediate experience does not give knowledge, and religious expe-
rience is a form of immediate experience. Therefore the scientific
method mast he applied to this experience before we have real know-
ledge. Scientific method is simply the refined process of knowing.
We must test all the data of experience for the purpose of guarding
against error. It is quite easy to interpret religious experience
erroneously. Therefore, this experience will not yield knowledge
unless it is subjected to the best methods of interpretation at our
disposal. "The experience of God by itself alone does not consti-
tute religion. One must interpret that experience before he has a
religion." ^
Scientific method in religion aims at the correct interpreta-
tion of the data of religious experience. The study of science will
show us that we do not interpret experience correctly. That which
we experience as red is the vibration of light. We, therefore, have
no right to say that the qualities we experience are exactly as we
have experienced them to be. The same is true of religious experi-
ence. "Insanity is an experience, but the insane man does not nec-
essarily know what insanity is nor even know that he is experiencing
3it." Scientific method, then, as applied to the experience of God
1 EESM, 23.
2 Ibid., 45.
3 IOL, 192.
..
.
.
is no more revelant than the application of it to any other expe-
rience. To "be scientific means simply to he intelligent. Surely
this is not too much to ask to he applied to the kind of experience
we designate as religious. Religion, too, should he subjected to
the method of intelligence. *
The chief objection to calling this method scientific is that
it makes one think of special sciences which are selected parts of
experience. However, science has won its present favor because it
has selected just the data which belong to it, and it has studied
within certain limits. The knowledge of God must also be made ex-
act in the sense of correct interpretation.
Religion has no way of attaining knowledge of God except
through the method of intelligence and interpretation. Religious
experience supplies the data, but not the knowledge. We must have
a science by which we distinguish the truth and error of our in-
terpretation. This does not subtract from the unique quality of
religion. If religion is true, it will stand firm before all the
tests which are applied to it. However, without these tests one
cannot be sure that his belief holds truth. The method of science
is the method of knowing, and the experience of God must ultimately
be subjected to such method. With the data of religious experience
and the testing of that data by the best methods we know, we may be
reasonably sure of the truth of our beliefs.
^ See "Kallen's Criticism: A Reply. " Journal of Philosophy
.
25 (1928), pp. 435 - 438.
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Chapter III
GOD AND VALUE
A. The Experience of Value.
There is something in the universe which has supreme value
for all human living. The human being has constantly before him
the ideal of some existence of greatest value, either for himself
or for the human race. That man does experience or try to attain
values can hardly be denied. The distinguishing characteristic of
the human race is that it does try to achieve something which it con-
siders to be of worth. Human life, especially human life dominated
by reason, shows a definite striving for the increase of values.
A peculiar characteristic of value is that it may not be a com-
pletely isolated experience as single sense experiences may be. That
which may be called a value or a good requires two or more activities
working together to perpetuate, augment, and intensify one another.
Value consists in integration, in organic unity. "Y&ienever a man ex-
periences an organic unity in which he himself is one of the mutually
sustaining factors, he experiences something which satisfies him and
which is, therefore, a value.” *
A beautiful painting is not of itself a value. A person may
look at the painting and have a perfect perception of its forms and
colors, and still it may not be for him a value. But when the inte-
*
"A Workable Idea of God,” Christian Century
. 46 (1929), 227.
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grating process "begins in such a way that the painter’s message is
supported in the observer’s own mind, or the painter’s ideas of
"beauty are sustained in his, or the beauty of the painting is in-
tensified for him by its enhancement of a beauty which he has ex-
perienced, a value begins to grow. There must be these mutually
sustaining factors in every experience of value.
We can see, then, that the greater the integration, the more
mutually sustaining factors there are, the greater will be the value.
To a person who understands the stage setting, the historical back-
ground, the story, the technique of acting, the technique of sing-
ing, the quality of orchestration, the dramatic effects of music,
and all the fine points of opera, an opera will be a far greater
value than to a person who hears the opera only as a pleasant sound.
There is more mutual sustenance, and hence, greater value. Now a
human being has reached a stage of complexity in the world’s evolu-
tion in which he is the most highly integrated creature we know.
The individual person is capable of realizing far greater diversity
and quality of possibility than is a rock or a tree. His value may
be measured by the range of possibilities which he is capable of ac-
tualizing by the rich qualities of the integrations which are
brought to a focus in him,
"The marvelous thing about the human mind, however, and the
reason it has such great value, is that its basic principle of or-
ganization is so plastic, yet so tough and tenacious, that it can
be preserved intact throughout most radical reorganization of the
'••
• t i
,
,
,
•
,
•
.
,
t
,
. <
k
,
-r
,
-•
,
,
-
,
12
*
%
qualities that enter into it. ... Hence the human mind is capable
of greater progress, greater increase of value, than anything else
we know." * There is a larger sum total of experience, there are
more mutually sustaining factors in an experience of value for the
human being, than for any other creature.
Because man is interested in value, he is also interested in
the greatest value which it is possible for him to attain or which
he can apprehend. It is this which makes him human. What, then, is
this greatest value for which man would strive? Yftiat might be called
the greatest possible value? Would it not conceivably be a system
which included the greatest diversity of values so related and or-
ganized that each promoted and intensified the others? The greatest
values are possible where there is greatest mutual sustenance. The
highest possibility of value, then, would be a system in which all
values experienced by different individuals were so organized that
they would act creatively on one another. Such a possibility can
be only if there is some order which makes it possible. "Human ef-
forts can be efficacious in bringing a desired possibility to pass
only when there is some order in which and with which men can work
to that end. ... God is that order of existence and possibility
2
which includes this possibility of greatest value to be attained."
If this order which makes value possible does not exist, then human
effort is futile and foolish. Only if this order is a reality, only
^
"Value and the Individual." Jour . Phil.* 25 (1928), 237.
2 IOL, 163.
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if this order supports and increases the possibility of value, is
there any hope that human effort will he rewarded by the attainment
of the something higher after which it strives.
B. The Objectivity of Value*
In order to show that the attainment of value is possible in
human life, it must be shown that value is inherent in the totality
of all being. In other words, value must be seen to be objective, as
much more than a human process. This process makes possible the at-
tainment of human value, but it pertains not only to human beings,
but also inheres in the extra-human universe. It is a characteristic
of the whole of reality.
If this structure which sustains and promotes values were not
in the universe to some degree, we could have no experience of value
whatever. We experience only that which is present in, or possible
in, the universe. The structure, then, which includes or sustains
the possibility of value must be a. reality. This structure which
promotes, sustains, and constitutes supreme value is God. M It is
that order of structures of value, actual and possible, which will
ultimately issue in the realization of the greatest value when we
ri^itly conform to its requirements." *
Man cannot claim that he alone is responsible for the attain-
ment of value. There is a more-than-human process which enters in.
When a field of grain is ready to harvest, man may say that it is the
result of his work. A part of it does represent man’s achievement.
1
IOL, 221 - 222
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but it is far more the achievement of rain, sunshine, and soil, and
the process of all combined forms integrations to produce the grain.
An artist may claim that he has produced a great work of art, but
far more than the artist enters into his work. The accumulated cul-
ture of the centuries, the mechanism of the artist f s bodily organism,
and his mental processes, for none of which man is responsible, en-
ter into the work of art and make it a possibility. Thus man is a
factor in the value-producing process, but he is only a factor. The
possibility of his achieving value is real only because of the value-
making, integrating process which builds up the structure friendly
to the attainment of value.
The universe has a basic principle of organization which pro-
vides for the mutual sustenance of processes which make for value,
Man can achieve value only when he adjusts himself to this process
so that he becomes a part of the sustaining activity. The problem
of progress is to magnify this sort of organization and so bring a-
bout the unactualized. All the building-up process of the universe
is present in this value-producing activity. This is a part of the
process of nature, but it is not the whole of nature. There is also
a tearing-down process, a process which is destructive of value.
But God must be identified with that process of existence which car-
ries the possibilities of greatest value.
Is God process or possibility? Which is more important, that
which is a possibility, or the process which sustains, enhances, and
promotes possibilities? God is the process which carries these pos-
,
.
' •••!.•
,
-
'
,
.
,
: \ *
:
, « id
,
. ,
• •• «*. j : v *xf; it -;o
,
_
,
-
.
.
,
,
.
•
'
, ,
'
15
sibilities. He is, therefore, more inclusive than a mere possibility
could he, "The process cannot he considered of any less value than
the highest possibilities which it carries," *
Process seems to denote or suggest something passive, ineffi-
cacious, that does nothing. This a wrong interpretation, however,
for there is nothing we can think of which is not in some sense a
process. Personality, government, a tree, a solar system, are all
processes. That process which includes the greatest possibility of
value is more than these and includes them all. "Thus God is the
2
most beneficent actuality and the supreme ideal."
C. God as Distinguished from the Ideal.
God is the supreme ideal, but this does not mean that he is to
be identified with the human ideal. It is true that he is the ideal
toward which human beings strive, but he is more than their concep-
tion of the ideal. The ideal is a possible value which the human
race may try to achieve or may ultimately actually attain. God, on
the other hand, is the value-making process in conformity to which
and in working with which the ideal may be attained. God is the
process through which man may achieve his ideals.
Can we seek the ideal directly without conformity to the proc-
ess of existence and possibility through which values are achieved?
"The only way in which any unattained possibility can ever be a-
*
"God and Value." In Macintosh, RB, 158.
2 Ibid., 176.
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chieved is by operating with that order by which it is brought to
pass.” * One does not become an athlete by ignoring all the rules
of training. Neither does one attain any ideal by ignoring the
process through which the ideal may be achieved.
God is not merely a possibility to be achieved; he is more
than any idea which a human conception could ever formulate. The
possibility after which the human being strives is the ideal. God
is that process through which the highest possibilities of value can
be achieved. God is therefore far more than the ideal. No possibil-
ity can be a possibility merely by being thought. It can become such
only when there is some order which makes it possible. God is not
limited to existence; he also includes all possibilities. It is prob-
able that no one's idea of the order of possibility and value is with-
out error. We assume, of course, that any one's idea would be incom-
plete. It seems evident, however, that the ideal can be achieved only
through this process which makes value possible. This process is God.
D. God as Distinguished from Personality.
This view does not claim that God is a person or that he is of
the nature of personality. "Personality is that which communicates
p
and hence shares experience." Personality is something which has
to develop and develops partly because of the factors around it. It
A IOL, 164.
2 IOL, 209.
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develops only in interaction, especially in interaction with other
personalities. It can exist only in a society and is, therefore,
created by interaction. Personality does not create this kind of
interaction, but is created by it.
The process which makes possible the formation of personality
is greater than its product which is personality. The order through
which integrations are formed produces many forms of existence, the
most important of which is personality. It deserves this distinction
because of the niceness of selection and discrimination of the asso-
ciations which form and develop personality. However, in this order
of highest possible values personality is only a factor. Personality
is a component in that structure through which values are achieved.
Because of the rich degree of integration attained in personality it
is capable of attaining a high degree of value. However, personality
is only one means by which value is achieved. The value-making proc-
ess contains all the possibilities of value, and this process is re-
sponsible for that high degree of integration called personality.
Personality is an abstraction without physical conditions, or-
ganisms, and meanings, as a smile is an abstraction without a face. *
God cannot be a personality because he is infinitely more. He is not
bound by the conditions which bind personality. This order of value
includes personality but is more than personality. That order is
personal if by personal one means that personalities are involved in
it; but God involves more than personalities. This process which
1 See IOL, 219
,. 1 .
*
.
.
.
•
• a
’
'• It .
,
,
,
.
,
,
. i ,
'
.
.
'
r
18
constitutes the possibility of all value is far more extensive than
any personality could he; it is more valuable than any personality
could be. *
The claim has been made that if God is not a personality we
cannot have personal relations with him. We do not have relations
with God as we do with persons, but that does not mean that we get
no response from God. "For we do get response from God, and the
kind of response we get from God far exceeds the value of any re-
2
sponse which any personality could make." The nature of the re-
sponse is the increase of personal powers, the increase of social
values through the more perfect associations of personalities, and
* It must be noted here that Wieman in some of his earlier
works does not deny personality in God, although he never says that
God is personality. In Beligious Experience and Scientific Method he
says: "Nothing is implied by this definition concerning personality
in God; but neither is personality denied." (p. 10) Wieman gives one
other statement in which he does not reject the ascription of person-
ality to God. "We have no objection of the attribution of personality
to God providing it is not done in such a way as to impair the practi-
cal workability of the idea of God." ("A Workable Idea of God." Eel.'
Ed., v. 23, p. 966). However, in a later article by the same name in
The Christian C entury . Wieman makes no statement concerning personal-
ity as attributed to God. In his later works all such statements are
lacking. In his latest book. The Issues of Life , he devotes an en-
tire chapter to the denial of God's being personality. His chief ar-
guments therein have been given in the paragraphs above.
We may assume, then, that Wieman does not attribute personality
to God, or at least, that he does not think of God as personal. That
is, he might say that God is personality plus (with emphasis on the
plus), but he would not say that God is merely a person. Because of
the limitations of personality he assumes that God is not a person;
God, he claims, does not have these limitations.
2
IOL, 225
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the increase of value as a whole through this human collaboration
with the value-making process. The order of God can possess the
world when man makes right adjustment to it. Things happen for the
good which would not otherwise occur when the attitude of the per-
sonality is so readjusted as to fit into this order. The resultant
improvement and increase of value is the response which comes from
God. "The intervention of God means the fuller entry into our pres-
ent existence of that order of community which leads to the greatest
values."
*
The fact that the personal pronoun "he" has been used to refer
to God does not indicate the underlying but unadmitted acceptance of
personality in God. The impersonal pronoun "it" suggests something
less than personality as a tree or a mountain. The personal pronoun
is just as deceptive, for its connotation is that of something far
less than God. Both pronouns have been used simply for want of bet-
ter words. Our language is inadequate to express the greatness of
God.
1 101, 232 f.
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Chapter IY
RELATION OF GOD TO HUMAN EXISTENCE
A. Our Experience of God,
Nothing is more important in the attempt to fathom a part of
the nature of God than to define God in terms of concrete experi-
ence, This does not mean at all that God is nothing hut our expe-
rience, hut rather that we do experience him as we experience any
other actuality. The experience of God is experience of something
as external to man as any tree or stone of which he is cognizant.
If the object of religious devotion exists only in the human mind
then it deserves to he discarded along with other cherished illu-
sions. This is not, however, the case, "Whatever else the word
God may mean, it is a term used to designate that Something upon
which human life is most dependent for its security, welfare, and
increasing abundance." ^ The very fact that there is human life
shows that this Something exists, and since human life is dependent
upon it, it must he external to human life.
There is no special kind of knowledge which is knowledge of
God. That is, there is no inner sense, "eye of the soul," special
organ, or intuitive knowledge through which we may learn to know God.
% experience God as we experience houses, trees, men, and all other
objects which we know. "To try to separate the experience of God
1 RESM, 9.
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from all other experience so that while all other conscious experi-
ence involves sensation, the experience of God does not, is to make
experience of God unreal and impossible in the eyes of all who under-
stand the nature of conscious experience.” * The idea that there can
he inner or special knowledge of God is unacceptable because that
idea confuses immediate experience with knowledge. Immediate experi-
ence does not give knowledge although it is an indispensable constit-
uent in knowledge. It supplies the data from which knowledge is de-
duced. Furthermore, the idea of special knowledge of God implies
special faculties of the brain for various kinds of knowledge. These
mysterious faculties of discernment have long been discarded by psy-
chologists. To put knowledge of God outside the field of scientific
knowledge is to put it where it can never be proved or tested. This
would put religion in a place where it would be ignored by all think-
ing people.
There are two kinds of knowledge; knowledge by acquaintance
and knowledge by description. (These terms are used here somewhat
differently from the sense in which William James uses them. ) Know-
ledge by acquaintance is knowledge by experience, that which is ex-
perienced through the senses or could be experienced through the
senses. Let us explain here that knowledge by acquaintance is not
purely sense experience. We never experience anything as an experi-
ence only of the senses. But sense experience must enter into every
experience, and sense experience is the only medium through which
* From an unpublished article in answer to criticisms from
Albert Edward Day.
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knowledge of the outside world may enter. This knowledge, of which
sense experience is an integral part, is knowledge "by acquaintance.
Knowledge hy description, on the other hand, is knowledge which is
built upon a system of concepts. Mathematical points and lines are
such objects of knowledge because they do not refer to any data of
experience. Both kinds of knowledge require a whole system of con-
cepts, but the difference between the two is this: in knowledge by
acquaintance, the concept refers to certain data or a datum of ex-
perience; in knowledge by description, the concept refers to another
concept or system of concepts. This logical system must be the form
of all accurate knowledge, but the difference is that knowledge by
description is known only through a logical consist ency which does
not define any object entering our immediate awareness. It is based
on concepts instead of experience.
This question concerning the kinds of knowledge bears directly
upon our knowledge of God. Is God an object that enters into imme-
diate awareness or is he merely a system of concepts? Is he a mat-
ter of speculation built up through logical consistency? "Either
God is an object of sensuous experience, or else He is purely a sys-
tem of concepts and nothing more." * In either case God must be
known through a system of concepts; but if God may be known by ac-
quaintance then the concepts refer to a reality which we can experi-
ence; if we cannot experience God then the concepts refer only to
other concepts. Logic, of course, has an important part to play in
all knowledge, but knowledge by acquaintance is logic plus experi-
1 RESM, 28
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ence, while knowledge by description is purely logic,
God is not a logical or mathematical configuration. All ex-
perience is experience of something, and religious experience is as
real as any other type of experience. All experience must he inter-
preted scientifically (the refined method of knowing) if we are to
know the object of our experience; so also, with the experience of
God,
Why should the knowledge of God he so uncertain if he is expe-
rienced in the same way as all other knowledge is experienced? The
data of the experience of God are so complex that our methods of
knowing are not yet able to cope with them. There is a merging of
many experiences in our experience of God, and just which part of
the experience forms the data denoting God is hard to determine.
There is this merging of experiences in everything which we per-
ceive. For example, when we perceive a penny we see a small, round,
flat, reddish-brown object. The fact that we perceive color is due
to light, but light is our experience of the sun. We therefore expe-
rience the sun when we experience the penny. We see the penny in a
certain position, but the penny holds its position because of the
gravitation of the earth and its position in relation to many other
bodies. Thus, in experiencing the penny we experience all these oth-
er bodies also. The experience also involves our own organism, and
thus another experience enters into the experience of the penny. We
do not, however, perceive all this when we perceive the penny. We
have learned to exclude all the wealth of experience and recognize
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only the specific data hy which we characterize the penny. The
hits of experience which we select to distinguish an object are no
more real than all the data which pertain to that object. We have
formed habits of selecting special bits of experience in order to
characterize the particular objects which we know. We have not done
this in the case of God. Perhaps the difficulty is that we have
shut out too much of our experience and so have excluded God. At
least, we have not learned to select (as we have in the case of phys-
ical objects) the experiences which distinguish experience of God.
The data pertaining to God and other minds are so complex, that these
are the things we know with greatest difficulty.
We can, however, have acquaintance with God even if our know-
ledge of him is inaccurate and inadequate. Men had experience of
and acquaintance with matter long before science gave them more ex-
act knowledge of it. We do not know what electricity is, but we do
know what it will do and how we can use it. We want to make our
knowledge of God more scientific, but before that time is reached,
we can have acquaintance with God because we can experience him.
In an experience of God the habitual processes of selective-
ness are broken down and one becomes aware of a far larger portion
of the sum total of human experience which enters all our experi-
ences, but which is ordinarily excluded. The bounds of awareness
are extended so that there is an undefined awareness of the total
passage of nature. Perhaps such an experience eomes most commonly
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in a great crisis. At such a time one's attention becomes diffusive
instead of clearly prescribed, and the attention is focused on noth-
ing definite. There is a mass of diverse experience which pours in
on one, the whole being is permeated with such experience, and there
is no determining adjustment of established pattern. There is no
"conceptualized cognition” * of these unanalyzed masses of experi-
ence which surge over one. The established system of response by
which we react to habitually recognized data is broken down. Then
there is a simultaneity of responses which makes one aware of a vast
multitude of concurrent experience. This state of diffusive aware-
ness is an experience of God.
2
The experience of God is by no means limited to a time of cri-
sis. An experience of great beauty may serve to break down normal re-
sponses so that one is aware of only a vast stream of simultaneous
experience. The beauty is so fashioned that we can be simultaneous-
ly responsive to all its parts. When we experience the rich concrete
fullness of the world in all its beauty along with the realm of pos-
sibilities which inhere in the world, we have one of the fullest ex-
periences of God. This experience may come in worship of God. "The
function of beauty in public worship is to make us aware of a reality
which is richer and deeper and more marvelous than anything we can
1 See RESM, 37.
^ To the writer there appears to be some inconsistency in this
explanation of Wieman's and in his previous discussion of the way in
which we know God. See page 68 of this thesis for a criticism of
this view.
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dream or conceive.” * In worship there is usually the shutting out
of our daily activities, our customary attitudes of response, and
thus it is easier to allow this unanalyzed stream of experience to
possess the "being. Thus we experience God in worship.
There is also mystical experience of God which is very similar
to the experience which we have just described. Mysticism is not so
mysterious as it is often represented to be. Mysticism is not oper-
ation with symbols which do not refer to anything in experience. It
is simply a certain method of experiencing the world of empirical
fact. This follows if we hold God to be an object of experience. In
the mystic state there is a partial interruption of the thought proc-
esses and a vast fullness of sensuous experience which enters. This
is merely a form of immediate experience. As has been said previous-
ly, immediate experience does not yield knowledge, and this experi-
ence must therefore be subjected to intellectual criticism after the
mystic state. Immediate experience is not knowledge until it is cor-
rectly interpreted.
All this experience which we call experience of God must be
tested by the very best thought processes which we know. The expe-
riences must be tested scientifically before they can be considered
correctly interpreted. In order to be really religious one must find
the meaning of one’s religious experiences. Religion is not illusion.
We have yet no science of God, and our interpretation has been and is,
therefore, very crude. The only way man has of correcting these er-
1 MPRL, 129
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rors is to subject his interpretations to the method of detecting
error and revealing truth. The scientific method, the refined proc-
ess of knowing, is the only method which we have. We have sufficient
data; it is the task of intellect to discover God through the "best
possible interpretation of the data.
B. Necessity of Adjustment.
If we do not have complete knowledge of God is it possible to
make adjustment to him or to know his will? To do this must be one
of the chief concerns of all human life. Social adjustment to God is
more important and more necessary than speculations concerning him.
Adjustments are successfully made with electricity, and yet no one
knows exactly what it is. There are many diverse theories as to what
electricity may be; but while we have been speculating we have also
learned to adjust ourselves to this powerful destructive force in
such a way that the destructive force has become instead a source of
power for many kinds of service. The same thing is true concerning
what is known as matter. Theories have changed and are still chang-
ing. Matter reduced to electrons and protons is still incomprehen-
sible. Nevertheless, for thousands of years men have made quite
successful adjustments to it. Adjustment to God, although far more
complicated and vastly more important than the adjustments of which
we have just spoken, is likewise possible without complete knowledge
of what God is.
"God is this most subtle and intimate complexity of environ-
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mental nature which yields the greates^good when rififrt adjustment is
made. God may he much more than this, hut at least, he is this.” *
We know that it is possible to make adjustment to environment and to
live under vastly different conditions. God is much more than envi-
ronment, hut includes environment. God is an integrating process in
which we become increasingly interdependent and more mutually coop-
erative
.
This process is more than human in that it goes on inde-
pendently of human purpose. However, when human beings make adapta-
tion to it, it will make possible for humanity the greatest goods of
life.
This process of integration is cosmic in its scope. ”Electrons
interact in such a way as to make atoms, atoms to make molecules,
molecules to make cells, cells to make living organisms, living or-
ganisms to make individual minds and human society.” In this vast
movement in which all of life is related man forms an important part.
It is this process which makes and develops him. Through joining with
the process which builds up life including all its possibilities of
value, man can attain heights of which he has not yet dreamed. To
struggle against this process is to bring ruin and destruction. Ev-
erything that exists involves in its being the totality of all being.
The smallest plant is possible only because the centuries of evolu-
tion of the earth have made the soil conducive to the life of the
plant, because the relation of the earth to the sun is such that the
conditions of temperature are suitable for the growth of the plant.
The plant is a part of the culmination of this process which has
1 WRT, vi.
2 MPBL, 52
.. <
.
,
,
.
,
,
«
,
.
.
,
,
#
,
,
29
teen at work for millions of years. Humanity is a part of the cul-
mination of this process. All forms of being enter in to help make
any part of being what it is. Man must adjust himself to this proc-
ess which integrates all being.
"This order of God is like the fire that burns and the torrent
that destroys." * Life must be given in complete abandon for the de-
velopment of more highly perfected integrations. Life must be given
in complete organic adaptation or in complete adaptation to that or-
der which yields the greatest possible good through communication.
We cannot live without the support of the world, and the world is al-
tered by our being in it. We are sustained by that of which we are
a part, but we cannot be sustained by struggling against that which
gives us being. God may be a destroyer; he may destroy us for the
sake of yet higher integrations. The chief work of this process is
not, however, destruction but construction of more highly integrated
being. Man is woven into this net of interdependence in which he is
sustained and of which he forms a part. Thus his life and the com-
mon little things of his life must be woven in with the cosmic pur-
pose. Only so can he or his purposes be maintained.
The necessity for adjustment should not conceal the fact that
in adaptation to this process the greatest possible values in life
are made possible. The order of God is tie order of community which
leads to the highest values. God is that which progressively in-
creases to the maximum the value of existence. "It is that upon
1 IOL, 235
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which we are ultimately dependent for the attainment of the greatest
good and to which we must conform our lives in order to experience
that good.” * The religious life is life devoted to the greatest in-
crease of value in and through this process. The very interdepend-
ence necessitated hy the integrating process makes greater value pos-
sible. Values interpenetrate. Through the interpenetration of the
greatest values in life we discern God, the process of integration*
In order to attain the maximum values of life one’s attitude
must he such that one aims deliberately to meet the requirements of
the process of integration. Such an attitude does have power to make
the world different. The order of God becomes more potent where man
seeks to cooperate with it. It leads to the attainment of highest
values through community and cooperation. This order is so related
to communicating personalities that the interrelationship makes pos-
sible the greatest values. Prayer is the attitude of the personality
to unite its efforts with this process. In this outreach of human
personality for the order of God, things happen for the good which
would otherwise be impossible. The only way to attain a possible
value is in cooperation with the process through which values are
brought to pass. It may be the only way, but it is the only neces-
sary way. Such a system organizes values creatively so that each
affects the other. "Ideally it would make all experiences enjoyable
even when painful because of the recognized function which such
*
"Eight Ways to Justify Eeligion." Christian Century , 47
(1930), 142.
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painful experience might have in sustaining a total system of val-
ue, " * It is conceivable that such ideal experience would be pos-
sible in complete adjustment to and cooperation with the value- mak-
ing process, or God,
C, Attainment of Value,
Value must be attained through the structure which sustains,
promotes, and constitutes value. The order of all existence is
characterized to some degree by the attainment of value; otherwise
we could have no experience of value. The attainment of maximum
value would be achieved in a system in which all the intelligent
strivings and aims of men were brought into cooperation with the
rest of nature so that each would give mutual support and suste-
nance to the other. Each would work for all and all for each. This
mutual support must extend from generation to generation and from
age to age. Such a process would be integration in the highest de-
gree.
We do find this mutual enhancement in the processes of nature
and in the sustenance of nature for the life of man. What, then, is
man’s part in this process? Man’s fuller entry into this process
will necessitate the destruction of his present way of life. His
struggle for personal value must enhance all other value. Only so
can there be mutual sustenance of values, and only so may he attain
value which will be permanent. The thing which makes man human is
^
"God and Value,” In Macintosh, BE, 163,
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the striving for the attainment of that which he thinks worth while*
The maximum attainment of value will not he possible without the Co-
Operation of man. The highest integration has been attained in man;
he is therefore an indispensable part of the totality of all being
in which value is possible. However, values must support each other,
and without the cooperation of man his destruction is inevitable.
1, Greatest attainment of value in human life . The more com-
plete the integration is, the greater will be the possibility of val-
ue. A system in which there are more values must be more valuable
than a system in which there are fewer. Consequently, the harmonious
working together of all parts of the universe will mean the produc-
tion of the greates value. In this connection the word universe does
not refer merely to the whole of physical nature. It includes the
hopes, aspirations, aims, thought processes of all the ages of human-
ity built upon each other. It includes the sum total of the thinking
of individuals and civilizations through the ages, as well as the sum
total of the physical processes during all the ages. All of this in-
volves a tremendous process of integration. The last and most highly
integrated product of this process is man. Therefore, the greatest
value is displayed in human life. The way of progressive integration
is coincident with the enhancement of human good. "The value-making
process must operate through human personalities and groups if the
greatest values are to be achieved." ^ "It is in the human mind and
1
"A Workable Idea of God tt Christian Century . 46 (1929), 228*
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in that interaction of human minds called human culture with all the
arts and sciences that the most intimate and subtle and complicated
mutual support and enhancement of activities arises.” * Value con-
sists of organic unity. The greatest unity of diversified qualities
developed by nature is man. Hence the greatest possibility of value
is found in humanity. Value cannot be separated from living organ-
isms or man. These are integral parts of all being, and since value
inheres in all being it must be an attribute of man and living organ-
isms also.
The process through which value is achieved is, however, great-
er than humanity; it is extra-human. What part, then, does the in-
dividual have to do with it? He gets into right relations with the
processes of nature, with the most valuable activities which he knows,
with society, and with other individuals. Then when the right ”con-
2
nections are made and the circuit is closed” something which is
more than human effort begins to work, but which in humanity finds its
culmination and greatest worth. The individual (or even humanity)
cannot control this value-making process; he can only serve it. He
is part of it, but he is nothing and can do nothing except in coop-
eration with it.
2. The possibility of the greatest good . The greatest can be
attained only when the human being subjugates his desires to the
whole system of value. ”Seed and soil, plant with plant and animal.
1
"A Workable Idea of God.” Religious Education . 23 (1928), 963
2 Ibid., 964.
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and all these with men, and men with groups of men* * must all he
united in this process for the production of value. The greatest
possible good is that good attained when man is in right adjustment
to the basic principle of organization of the universe. This prin-
ciple, which is the determining structure of the universe, contains
all the possibilities there are. It is in and through this struc-
ture alone that such possibilities may be actualized. When mankind
unites his efforts with this process so that all values act creative-
ly on one another we may expect the highest possibility of value. It
i s through this process which unites all values that the greatest
good may come. "At its highest level in human life it works by in-
2
creasing peace, good will and love among men." The possibility of
the greatest good is the achievement of the most comprehensive in-
terest.
The greatest possible good is the attainable good, conditions
being what they are. Some persons have argued that the best possi-
ble good might be the unattainable ideal; that not the best achiev-
able, but the best imaginable good would be the possibility of the
greatest good. What is the use, however, of talking about what
might be a conceivable good if conditions were different? The great-
est possible good holds within it all that is achievable under ex-
isting conditions. There is a sense in which the best imaginable
good may become the best possible. An Edison may imagine a world
p
"A Workable Idea of God." Religious Education . 23 (1928), 963,
"A Workable Idea of God." Christian Century. 46 (1929), 227.
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which would "be much better if it were illuminated by electric lights.
He begins to work with the existing conditions and produces that
which he has imagined. Another sort of imagination is that in which
one dreams of possible goods in a world which is totally different,
with the existing conditions changed. The last sort of imagination
is worthless, and the imaginable good that might exist in such a
world is not worth thinking about. The possibility of the highest
good lies within existing conditions, or conditions which may devel-
op, the world process being what it is. This good is, attainable in
right adaptation to Cod, the integrating process of the world.
D. The Goodness of Cod.
There is a process in the universe through which all being
comes to a focus in the separate parts of existence. Any one single
part of existence, such as a flower, is what it is because all the
processes of the universe are what they are; because the earth has
developed to what it is now so that conditions are offered which
properly support the flower; because the heat of the sun at this
particular period of existence enters into the makeup of the flower;
because all being is organized so that it enters into and becomes a
part of the flower. Everything which is has a part in this small
portion of existence. Some parts of being are far more closely re-
lated to it than others, but all being has something to do with it.
The principle through which all being comes to a focus is called the
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principle of concretion. The principle of concretion is the proc-
ess of the universe which "brings all "being into the makeup of each
tree, person, and movement of history.
2
"The concrete order of the world is good." The principle of
concretion constitutes the good. It is through this principle that
existence and achievement are possible. It is through this principle
that values are attained. Because of it man is, aspires, develops,
and "becomes all that he is capable of becoming. This principle is
God and God is good. God is the principle through which everything
is sustained and developed. All that is beautiful, all that consti-
tutes love, all that sustains man and makes possible for him the most
satisfying and abundant life, is good, "Good and concrete existence
are identical." All that which aids in making existence more con-
crete is good. The moral order is also a part of the concrete order.
It is evident that lying, murder, stealing, covetousness, all forms
of immorality, hinder and destroy the process in which all work for
the good of each and each works for the good of all. Y/hen all exist-
ence works for the improvement and mutual helpfulness of all that ex-
ists, we have an order which is good. The order through which such
This idea of the principle of concretion is discussed by Wie-
man in WRT, pp. 179-197, Wieman’s discussion is based largely on
Whitehead’s study of the nature of God as developed in his Beligion
in the Making and Science and the Modern World
.
The principle of
concretion will be further discussed in the next chapter of this
thesis. See pages 49-51.
Z
WBT, 201.
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reciprocal sustenance may be obtained is the order of concretion, or
God.,
Since values and good are experienced in the world as it is we
must conclude that there is a process through which values may be at-
tained and good experienced. This process is the good, for only
through it may the good become possible. Good comes because of the
process which integrates and unites making all parts of existence
dependent upon each other. Men can have a part in increasing the
good of life and of the world by cooperating with and adjusting them-
selves to this integrating order. This order of God is the order of
love. It is in and through this order that man may attain that com-
munity in which value for him involves value for the whole process of
life. There is_ this kind of good and the possibility of this kind of
value in the world, "All good is derived from the process of integra-
tion, It is derived from God, the integrating behavior of the uni-
verse,"
*
E, The Problem of Evil,
The principle of concretion is not the only process in the
world. There is also a contradictory process, the principle of evil,
which tends to break down concretions. Evil is the force which acts
against and breaks down the constructive order of the world. It hin-
ders the cooperative process of community in which each works for the
good of all, God is the sustainer of all which builds up, constructs,
1 MPRL, 58
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and integrates the world* Evil, on the other hand, is that which de-
stroys integrations and works against concreteness. Evil is devia-
tion from the law and order of the constructive forces of nature. It
is the process which would make a chaos of the cosmos.
1. Disintegration . Disintegration is evil; it is a parasite
on goodness; that is, on God, All of the possibilities of this world
are organized in a process of integration. It is a process in which
all events, all abstract forms, and all beings are utilized for mak-
ing richer and more inclusive events, forms, and beings. It is the
process which makes for beauty, love, and progression. There is also
a process, not so well defined and not so completely organized, which
works against the onward move of things. It is the process of disin-
tegration, or evil. This process is antagonistic to the order which
makes existence possible; it is destruction of integration and con-
creteness. It is the frustration of interests, not merely of human
interests, though of course it must be related to human interests;
but it is still more the frustration of the divine order of the uni-
verse. It is the tearing down of integrations, the hindrance of the
good.
This process works in human beings as well as in the cosmic or-
der. Evil among human beings is the process which destroys community
and harmony of interaction. The social order is developed by commu-
nication and the mutual sharing of experience. Such common sharing
develops a concrete order of society. The integration and develop-
ment are more complete in proportion as the mutuality is greater.

"It is plain that lying, stealing, infidelity — all forms of moral
wickedness — hinder or destroy that order and community which is
concreteness." * Such forms of destruction and hindrance to progress
constitute evil, for evil is frustration of the good.
2. Dependence upon the Int egrat ing Process . The process of
disintegration cannot and does not exist in and of itself. There
can he no evil unless there is first the good. Evil owes its exist”
ence to the very fact that there is good upon which it can prey. It
must have good to destroy or it cannot exist. For this reason there
is more evil where integrations are highest. There cannot he much
evil in a grain of sand for its integrations are so slight that there
is not much room for disintegration. But when we cane to human be-
ings, and especially organized society, the integrations are so com-
plex that there is much more for the disintegrating process to feed
upon. Such evils as war are disintegrations which are possible only
in highly complex concretions such as human society.
The fact that evil is dependent upon good does not mean that it
is eaused by the good. The order of concretion and value does not
create evil. Such a process is the striving for increased order and
value. Evil is that whieh would, and does, destroy, tear down, dis-
integrate, and bring chaos. Evil cannot be a product of good, al-
though it can thrive only where the good is found. Good and evil are
exclusive of each other. Evil is obstruction to the divine order.
It cannot exist without the good, but that does not mean that evil is
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inevitable wherever there is good. Consequently, the good cannot he
responsible for evil, but until it overcomes evil, it must struggle
against evil as a parasite.
3. The Solution of the Problem , The evidence which we have
indicates that the integrating process will prevail. In spite of e-
vil the movement of the ages seems to be in an upward trend. Faith
in God is faith that the good will prevail. It is doubtful if all
evil will eventually be overcome, so that that which strives after
good may settle down to a passive existence. This is not a pessimis-
tic outlook, for if the good prevails it will always be able to with-
stand evil. Evil could never completely triumph, for in doing so it
would destroy its own existence. If all good perished there would be
nothing for evil to destroy; evil would have no source of maintenance.
If the principle of concretion or its activity were completely frus-
trated, nothing would be left except abstract forms which are neither
good nor evil.
Evil may be transmuted so that for the purposes of the all-in-
clusive interest it may serve the cause of good. Certain frustra-
tions of less important interests are sometimes necessary for the
satisfaction of a more inclusive interest. For example, suffering
is an evil in that it involves frustration of interest. However, if
suffering is an indispensable element in the more inclusive interest
of love and so brings love to fuller expression, then suffering be-
comes good because it serves the most inclusive interest. Suffering
may be necessary to attain the highest good because it is one of the
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essential ingredients in the direct fulfillment of that good. When
evil can "be thus transmuted, so that it serves a more inclusive end
or helps bring about a greater good, evil becomes good. We see in
this process the ultimate triumph of good, not in the destruction of
evil but in its transmutation. "May not this transmuting power of
love, and atonement through suffering love, be the true solution of
the problem of evil and sin in a world ruled by an almighty good God?
To enter into the love of God is not to abolish evil but to trans-
mute it and triumph over it." ^
This does not imply that the present world with all its suffer-
ing and evil is the best possible world; neither does it imply that
all the evil in the world is necessary. There is much suffering and
evil which has not been transmuted into good. The transmuting power
of love has by no means attained the effectiveness necessary to tri-
umph over the present evil in the world. It is possible, however,
that to attain the supreme good all evil need not be overcome; but
it must be transmuted so that it serves the most inclusive good.
This transmuting power is God.
F. God as the Process of Interaction.
Among individuals, groups, and periods of history there is an
interaction which promotes the greatest possible mutuality or the
greatest good. It is a sharing of experience which makes development
possible. The consummation of the experience of one group is shared
1 RESM, 108
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with another through posterity; the combined, experiences of the in-
dividuals of this new group plus the knowledge of the experiences of
the old group is passed on to another group; the experiences of vari-
ous other groups are shared, and thus we have a great 'building up of
humanity through the sharing of experiences, God is the process
which makes this sharing and mutuality of experience possible. "God
is that interaction between individuals, groups and ages which gen-
erates and promotes the greatest possible mutuality of good." *
God is the process which promotes the greatest possibilities
of value. The more we observe the experience of value, the more we
see that the greatest values are possible by interaction of individ-
uals and groups in which the richest experiences are shared. This
experience which can be shared is experience which belongs to the
ages. The sharing of experience is not mere social contact. It is
like literature, art, or any experience of value; it must stand the
tests of universality and truth. It is something on which the ideals
of the ages may be built. Such experience is found "in great art,
in great philosophy, inscientific knowledge and in brotherhoods which
2
span the centuries." This shared experience is not merely repeated
experience in which conditions continue the same. Shared experience
is experience of value which remains valuable throughout the ages.
The possibility of what human life may achieve through communi-
^
"A Conversation About God." Christian Century
. 49 (1932), 186.
2
"Theocentric Religion." Religion in Life . 1 (1932), 111.
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cation or mutuality is almost inest imable. Such interaction has
scarcely more than begun. In this interaction all lives are inex-
tricably bound together. In the ideal mutuality of experience all
men, their ideals and aspirations and meanings, their physical or-
ganisms, and physical conditions are so adjusted to each other that
the whole good of each one includes the supreme good of all. The
greatest possibility of value for each is a constituent of the most
precious value for all. In such communication the meanings which
constitute the greatest values for each are those which contribute
to the common good. The values of the individual are bound inextri-
cably with those of all humanity. Such brotherhood is attained
through God who is the process of interaction and communication.
The mutuality which is attained in perfect communication might
be called The Kingdom of God. The mutuality of all men with one an-
other is the attainment of the highest brotherhood. God has been
called (symbolically) Father because of his sustenance and promotion
of mutuality among human beings. "The parent fosters this mutuality
in the family; God does it for all men." ^ God is this process of
loving communicative interaction through which mutuality and shar-
ing of richest experience are possible and through which the great-
est value is achieved.
This interaction is not initiated by men; rather it is what
generates men, not physically, but personally. The infant who comes
into the world becomes a human being through the sharing of experi-
ence with other human beings. Even men of rare greatness and ability
*
"A Conversation About God." Christian Century
.
49 (1932), 187.
-•
,
.
•
,
.
44
+
are created the same way. The accumulated thought and ideals of a
group are often "brought to a focus in one man who becomes a leader
and genius. But the interaction of the group and the sharing of ex-
perience are necessary to produce such a man. The interactions of
the group work through him and make him the spokesman of his time.
Thus this interaction is greater than man for it is superhuman. All
the possibilities of value may be attained through it. It is God, or
at least one aspect of God.
^
1 In "A Conversation About God” Wieman says that this inter-
action is, God; in "Theocentric Heligion" he says that it is ’’one
aspect of God.” The latter is probably more nearly what Wieman
means, since interaction is concerned almost entirely with human
beings. The process of integration concerns not only human beings
but all aspects of being.
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Chapter V
RELATION OF GOD TO COSMIC EXISTENCE
A. God as Distinguished from Totality of All Being.
"The whole existent world taken in its totality is not God." *
All of existence does not conform to the structure of God. There
are many processes in nature which reun counter to the process which
sustains integrations and values. There is, however, a constructive
process in nature which produces value and concretion. This process
is God; it is part of nature, hut it is not the whole of nature. It
2
is the "constitutional tendency" of the universe toward integra-
tion, God is not the universe, for God is not physical. Neverthe-
less, the universe is dependent upon this process, for without inte-
gration the universe would not he possible. There are many orders in
the universe, and these orders may not he reduced to one all-inclu-
3
sive order. God is the one order which sustains the possibilities
#
of greatest value. He cannot include all processes of the universe
regardless of whether or not they are valuable. The order of God in-
creases value.
1. God is one particular structure of the universe . God is
not the totality of all being, but rather the structure which inte-
grates so that all being is possible. God is the one sustaining
1 WRT, 187.
2
"A Workable Idea of God." Religious Education . 23 (1928), 965.
3 See IOL, 163.
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constitutive order of all being. He is the principle which tends to
make the universe ever more concrete. He is the principle which as-
sembles all being and brings it to a focus in each flower and person
and planet. He is the process which makes and sustains all concrete
things by rallying the whole universe to their support. This proc-
ess of integration which unites all being so that each works for all
and all for each, has reached its highest historical achievement in
society. This does not mean that this process is society taken in
its totality, for also in society there is much which runs counter
to the order of concretion. This process works in society but is far
more than society.
God is not the ultimate ground of all reality. It is doubtful
if the totality of all being has any one single ground. There may
be many different grounds, one as ultimate as the other. According
to Whitehead * there are three ultimate realities: (1) creativity
or process, (2) abstract forms, (5) the actuality which is God.
These are not set up as being final, but to show that a theory of
more than one ultimate reality may be upheld. God is not necessarily
the one ultimate reality. He may be one of several, or he may be a
part of the one ultimate reality. God carries the highest possibil-
ities of value and that is not true ofthe whole world ground. "Why
is God not the ultimate ground of all existence? Because he is not
* This explanation of Whitehead f s view is taken from Wieman*
s
article "Theocentric Religion” in Religion in Life . 1 (1932), pp,
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the ultimate ground of murder, lust, treachery and all the horrors
of existence,” ^
2, God excludes evil . It was stated in the previous section
that God is less than the whole of existence, and this is chiefly be-
cause God excludes all that is evil. Evil is the opposing process,
or the process of "anti-concretion,” Evil is the process of disor-
der, chaos, antagonism; it is the principle which breaks down con-
cretions, Though evil is dependent upon the good, it is not a part
of the good, God cannot in any way "be identified with the process
of evil. God includes the possibility of greatest value; evil does
not. The whole universe is not in every phase of its being steadily
moving toward improved integration. This hindrance is due to the
process of evil. If God were the all this progressive integration
would continue everywhere unceasingly. Thus, God is not the all, for
God excludes evil,
3, God transcends existent world . The previous discussion in-
dicates that God is less than the whole of existence, God is also
more than the whole of existence, God transcends existence and is
more completely operative in the realm of possibility. He is that
order of existence and possibility through which the greatest good
and value may be attained, God operates in the existent world and
also transcends it so that there is not only a present good but also
a possible good, A possibility can be such only where there is an
*
"Theocentric Religion.” Religion in Life . 1 (1932), 111
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order which promotes possibilities. God is the mediator between ex-
istence and possibility. He extends far beyond existence, although
he pervades and sustains all existence.
B. God as Sustainer of All Existence.
To say that God is the sustainer of all existence may be mis-
leading. God is not the totality of all being, nor has he created
all being; but without this integrating process all being would be
impossible. God is the tendency of the universe toward higher in-
tegrations, and without this integration life of any kind would be
impossible. There is an interaction among all the processes of na-
ture and there is much interaction in the life of man. The tenden-
cy of the universe which develops and produces value is God; the
tendency which produces interdependence and interaction is God.
In so far as all forms of being depend upon integration and
interaction God may be said to sustain them. This does not mean
that God has created everything and set it in its place in the uni-
verse. It does mean that all being depends on the process of inte-
gration and concretion. Even evil is to a certain extent dependent
upon this process since evil cannot exist without the good. This
process does not create evil, but evil lives upon it as a parasite.
The universe is dependent upon the process which makes it more or-
ganic; this process is God. To the extent, then, that the process
of integration is essential to all existence, God may be said to be
the sustainer of all existence
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C. God as the Principle of Concretion,
The principle of concretion is expressed in its simplest form
in Tennyson’s "Flower in the Crannied Wall:"
"Little flower — hat if I coaid understand
What yoa are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is,"
To know the flower in its totality would he to know everything, be-
cause all being enters in .some measure into the composition of the
flower. The flower "prehends" all being. As all being is necessary
to, and enters into, the composition of the flower, so does all be-
ing enter into each separate part of existence, but in different de-
grees of relevancy. Each particular part of being is what it is be-
cause it is the consummation in a particular relationship of all be-
ing. The principle which organizes all being so that it comes to a
focus in each particular part of existence is the principle of con-
cretion, or God.
In describing the process of concretion it is necessary to
mention the entrance, no matter how remotely, of all things into
The idea of God as the principle of concretion is White-
head’s. Wieman is not in total agreement with Whitehead, but ac-
cepts in the main Whitehead’s conception of God. In WET, pp. 191-
212, he applies his scientific and religious tests to this idea and
finds that for him this conception meets the tests. Specific ref-
erences which show Wieman’ s agreement with Whitehead are found in
WET, 200, 203, and 210. What Wieman generally calls "the process
of integration" has merely assumed a new name under "the principle
of concretion." Each name has different connotations, so Wieman
uses them both to explain more fully the nature of God.
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each particular thing. There is, however, something still more im-
portant which enters into each particular part of being to make it
what it is. All abstract forms, or universale, or principles enter
into the makeup of each entity. The principle that two things equal
to the same thing are equal to each other, or the principle that two
times two are four, is a universal because it is true under all con-
ditions; the principle was true before men ever formulated it. All
such principles enter into the makeup of each particular part of the
universe. These principles, while themselves nonexistent, enter in-
to the constitution of every existent thing to make it what it is.
These abstract forms or principles are eternal and changeless, but
their part in the order of the universe changes constantly. The pro-
portion in which they enter different parts of being varies, so that
the parts themselves are different and changing. However, it is such
principles which give to nature the element of permanence and defini-
tion.
This principle which brings all qualities, all abstract forms,
and all being into every particular thing is the principle of con-
cretion. It is the unification of the many into the one. Certain
parts of all being may enter very slightly into the composition of a
particular part; other parts may enter in to a very large degree; but
there is a relevance of each to all which makes all being share in
the parts of each particular bit of existence. This system of organ-
ization which makes all events have some share in the constitution of
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each stone and man and sun is the principle of concretion, or God,
There are different levels of concretion and prehension which
correspond to the progress and measure of value, "Progress occurs
and value is magnified insofar as all being is concreted," * One
level of existence is hi^ier than another because it is more con-
crete in bringing more parts of being to a focus. Thus man is high-
er than the animal
,
animal higher than plant
,
and plant higher than
the soil. The existent world is more divine in proportion as it
brings all parts of being more fully to a focus. This can be done
most completely in human society, because man is the most concrete
of all beings.
The dominant principle in the universe, which organizes all
being into concrete parts of existence, is God. He is the order
through which abstract forms and qualities and material are brought
to a focus in organized structures. He is the organizing construc-
tive force of the universe. This constructive force still has un-
finished work to do, and in this sense is an order of possibility.
D. God as the Order of Existence and Possibility.
God is the process in the universe which sustains the possi-
bility of greatest value. He is therefore an order partly of ex-
istence and partly of possibility. This process in the world which
integrates, builds, constructs, and draws all being into the partic-
WPT, 196
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ular construction is a process which is existent. It may therefore
he called an order of existence. Another name for this order through
which all existent beings are what they are, is God,
God is not limited to existence, hut includes also possibili-
ties. This does not mean that this order is a possibility to be a-
chieved; that is the ideal. God is the order through which and in
conformity to which the greatest possibilities may be achieved. The
highest possibility for mankind is not God; he is the process through
which the possibility may become actual. The possibility could not
be attained except through the process which makes it obtainable.
This process cannot be ignored while one struggles for the possibil-
ity. To strive for the ideal and ignore the process would be as fu-
tile as trying to make the sun stand still while ignoring the rota-
tion of the earth. ^ It is only in conformity with the order of pos-
sibility that the attainment of man's ideal is possible and may be-
come actual.
In so far as the process contains all the possibilities that
there are, it is an order of possibility. New integrations are pos-
sible in an unchanging order because the order is such that it al-
lows for constantly changing and perfected integrations. The order
contains the possibilities, and is therefore not limited to exist-
ence only. It transcends existence and enters the realm of the pos-
sible. This process is not a changing possibility, but it organizes,
or concretes, renewed possibilities and change.
1 See WBT, 164

53
E. God as Ultimate Cause,
This order which sustains all existent forms and "beings and
contains all possibilities, may also he called the ultimate cause.
The ultimate cause of all things is the process through which all
forms of existence come into being. The coming into being or ex-
istence is of "interest" to everything in the universe. It is for
the best good or interest of each part of being that it come to a
focus in some form. This structure of the universe which deter-
mines the entrance of the totality of being into the interests of
all forms of being, is the ultimate cause. The fulfillment of in-
terest of any form of being can be made only in adjustment to this
determining structure of the universe.
The ultimate cause is not every process of the universe, but
it is the process which determines the supreme good for each form
of being. The supreme good for each existent being is the fulfill-
ment of its most inclusive interest. The supreme good, as such, is
the fulfillment of the greatest number of interests, or it is a sys-
tem of inclusive interests. It consists in the greatest achieve-
ment of value for all things and beings, "The ultimate cause , . .
is that structure of the totality of all being which determines the
bearing of this totality upon our interests, whether to fulfill or
to frustrate them,"
1
Eeligion is the process through which human beings find adjust-
WBT, 160
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m
ment to the ultimate cause for the attainment of their best interests
or supreme good. In order to he true a religion must correctly de-
fine ultimate cause and supreme good, so that the individual or the
group may malce that adjustment which will yield that which really is
the supreme good for that individual or group. Religions may he dif-
ferent and still he equally valid. One group may in one way find ad-
justment to its ultimate cause and through such adjustment, the at-
tainment of its supreme good; another group may do it in a different
way.
1, The ultimate cause may he diverse . The ultimate cause and
supreme good are relative to diverse human characters; thus they may
he different for different groups and ages. The ultimate cause as
that structure of the universe which determines the hearing of all
being on the individual systems ofinterest, may he different for
certain groups and systems. There is no inclusive system of inter-
est which reaches and is sufficient for all races and ages. Conse-
quently, systems of interest, or that which is supremely good, dif-
fers with the group. The ultimate cause, which is the structure of
the world hearing upon different systems of interest, will he nec-
essarily varied when interests are diverse and not mutually inclu-
sive.
2. Yet the ultimate cause is one. On the other hand, the
ultimate cause is the structure of the universe underlying all these
systems of interest. It is the process which determines the hearing
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of the universe on all the systems of value of all peoples. In this
sense God is that undefined totality in response to which all per-
sons may develop various and diverse interests. Ultimate cause is
"the underlying, stimulating substance common to all.” ^
It is the fact that the ultimate cause underlies all systems
of interest which makes it possible to test the relative truth and
values of the various religions. Because the ultimate cause is re-
lated to and determines all the systems of value, it must be con-
cerned with the greatest good of all. A religion then, which is
true, must develop a conception of the ultimate cause which relates
the ultimate cause to the greatest number of values possible. A re-
ligion which is valuable for various groups and ages and in which the
most varied and largest number of values is possible for those groups
and ages, is the truest religion. It is doubtful if there can ever
be a religion which has such inclusive interest, but the religion
which most nearly approaches that ideal is the truest religion we can
find. Until that ideal has been attained humanity must struggle to
develop a religion with such an all-inclusive system.
A religion which includes the greatest system of interests for
humanity as a whole will lead to the supreme good. This supreme good
may be attained only in adjustment to the ultimate cause which deter-
mines the bearing of all being upon all established systems of inter-
est.
1 WRT, 172
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F. Summary of the Definition of God.
The definition of God is merely an attempt to sum up some of
the information we have about God. God cannot be pinned to a defi-
nition, for he is more than anyone or any group can define. Kan
cannot fully comprehend God, but knowing some facts about God, man
may be able to love and serve him. It is simply to clear somewhat
the concept of God that any definition is offered.
God is that which is supremely significant in all the universe
for human living. * "Whatever else the word God may mean, it is a
term used to designate that something on which human life is most
2
dependent for its security, welfare and increasing abundance."
ft
"God must be conceived as the value making process of the universe.”
Not only is God valuable for human beings, but he is valuable
for all forms of existence as well. God is the integrating process
which makes for increasing interdependence and cooperation in the
4
world. This integrating process has reached in society its great-
5
est historical achievement. A definition of God would not be true
which limited God to human life and welfare, God is concerned with
all being. He is that process which gathers up all being and trans-
6
fers it in some degree into each flower or animal or man. God is
1 RESM, 10.
2 Ibid., 9.
3 Workable Idea of God.” Religious Education , 23 (1928), 960.
* MPRL, 47.
I
Ibid., 79.
6 See WRT, 189.
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the process through which all being is related and united in attain-
ing the supreme good and establishing the most comprehensive systems
of value. God is not the all, but he is the process through which
the all is sustained. In the relation of all to each and each for
all, God is the order of community which leads to the highest val-
1
nee*
1 IOL, 252.
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Chapter VI
ESTIMATE OF WIIMAN’S VIEff
A. Favorable.
Every form of philosophy and every religions "belief has some
"saving" aspects about it. By that we mean there is something in
each philosophy and religion which is of value to someone. The per-
son who formulates such doctrines finds them valuable, and so far as
he is concerned, consistent with reality. The truth which one finds
in a belief is its saving quality for the individual who finds truth
in his doctrine. There is something in every belief which helps
someone; for this reason there must be some measure of truth or val-
ue in each belief. To evaluate a doctrine we must determine, as far
as we are able, what is true and what, if anything, is false in it.
In evaluating Mr. Wieman's view of God we shall seek first to find
in his philosophy that which we believe to be true.
Some indomitable yearning to know the truth impels man to seek
it by the best means at his command. What are these means? Man is
given experience and the ability (reason) to interpret this experi-
ence. This emphasis on experience and reason is one of the most
valuable things in Wieman’s philosophy. He seeks to prove by the
best means at his command the truth of his belief. One of the main
contributions of his view is that it seeks to give religion a place
with science in the world of known truth.
,- QC 3 . ’ .
. ,
.
,
. « ,
.
.
.
.
.
,
59
1. rt seeks to make religion scientifically demonstrable .
Religion has always teen concerned with proving the reality hack of
religious experience. If this reality could he reasonably demon-
strated, the facts of religion would he as widely accepted as those
of science. Religion, then, must demonstrate satisfactorily the ex-
istence of God. According to Wieman’s definition of God there can
he no doubt that God exists; he is a proved fact. There is an or-
ganizing, integrating process in the world, and this fact has heen
fully demonstrated hy the experience of the ages. Wieman’s defini-
tion of God cannot he refuted; that is, that there is such a fact
in the world cannot he denied.
The method of science is essentially the method of the estab-
lishment of fact. Until a theory is proved to he true it maintains
the status of being only a theory. Now religion, historically, has
stated as facts many things which it has not proved. Consequently,
among many thinking people, religion has fallen into disrepute.
Wieman shows that God, according to his definition is a fact.
That God cannot he fully known does not make the method of
having relationship with him unscientific. Men always have some ac-
quaintance with realities before they are scientifically verified.
Nevertheless, one can know that such a fact exists, and he able to
deal with it scientifically. Wieman would place our knowledge of
God on a scientific plane. He bases religion upon the facts of hu-
man experiences and would test these experiences hy the scientific
use of reason. This would insure scientifically the validity of re-
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ligious thought and of religious experience.
Certainly religious experience is as valid as any other form
of experience. It is the most powerful motivating force which the
world has known. Why, then, should religion not have a place equal
to that of science? Wieman would give it an equal place, and he
seeks to do so hy showing that God is a scientifically verifiable
fact. He begins by stating that which we know to be true and would
build up scientifically on those facts.
A religion scientifically verifiable and yet which took ac-
count of the facts of religious experience would appeal to practi-
cally all classes of people. The scientist would respect the truth
in it; the mystic would value the aid and guide for living which it
brings. To demonstrate the validity of religious and mystical expe-
rience, to show that God is an undeniable reality, and to place re-
ligious thought on a par with scientific thought, is the chief con-
tribution which Wieman seeks to make. He does not take an accepted
definition and try to prove it; he observes the facts of experience
and makes his definition fit those facts as he sees them.
2. It is theocentric . Another important aspect of Wieman*
s
view is that it assumes God as the center. Wieman holds that the
process of integration dominates the universe "and without it there
could be no universe at all." ^ That is not, however, the total idea
of a theocentric religion. To use Wieman 1 s own term, a religion is
1 MPHL, 54
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"God-c entered" when it assumes belief about God as the central fact
of the universe because such belief seems to meet the test of truth.
A religion is theocentric when its beliefs about God conform as near-
ly as possible to the reality of God. A man-centered religion holds
its beliefs about God because they bring value and happiness to his
life. Wieman’s definition of God is not in terms of his value to
man, but in terms of reality as Wieman sees it.
We claim that Wieman’s view is theocentric in spite of the
fact that some of his definitions of God speak of God’s value to
man, and in spite of the criticism given his view by Harris Frank-
lin Rail. * The fact that human beings find God helpful is not the
reason that God is God. It simply happens incidentally that this
process which produces integrations is also helpful to man. Kan can
develop his highest possibilities through this process, but that
does not prove the process, nor does it define the process. In spite
of Rail’s accusation that Wieman’s definition is anthropocentric, we
cannot find anywhere in Wieman’s writings the suggestion that God
should be defined in terms of his use to man. On the contrary Wie-
man says, "It may be that man himself will sometime be destroyed for
the sake of yet higher integrations. God is terrible; but he is
creator of greatest good.” 2 Again, he says in speaking of value in
connection with personality: "But personality is not the end or goal
* Rail, H. F.
,
"The Idea of God in Recent Literature." Re-
ligion in Life
. 1 (1932), 62-65.
2
KPRL, 59
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of this order which is God." * We admit that some of Wieman f s def-
initions taken away from their context would indicate that this view
is concerned with proving God’s use to man. Taken in its totality
Wieman’s view cannot he so considered. He stresses the fact that
man must adjust himself to this process. God so defined is not a
value to man unless man is willing to yield himself to this process.
Such yielding may necessitate man’s changing his desires, so that
man does not serve his own interests, hut works merely in cooper-
ation with this process. This is not God defined in terms of his
value to man; it is the relentless definition of truth as Y/ieraan
sees it, A definition of God must he as nearly consistent with
truth as possible. Wieman has achieved this so far as he is con-
cerned.
3. It requires the highest nobility . To he devoted to some-
thing other than one’s self requires the greatest nobility of char-
acter. It is somewhat easier to he good if one hopes to attain
heaven; hut to do that which is right because one ought requires
strength of character. To yield one’s will and change one’s desires
for the sake of the whole good and without hope of personal reward
is a true test of character. The religion which Wieman advocates is
not centered in the value of religion to man; man ought to adjust
himself to this process. According to Wieman personality is not of
itself of value unless it is devoted to some cause greater than per-
1 IOL, 229
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sonality. 1 This is true religion, to find something greater than
one’s self to which to devote one’s life. The devotion because one
ought and not because of hope of reward is the thing which makes
such devotion noble and which develops character. This does not
mean that blind devotion to a cause ennobles character; that is not
what Wieman means. He stresses the fact that there must be three
qualities in devotion: the cognitive side (the method of implacable
reason), the emotional side, and the volitional side. To be devoted
to ’’mutuality magnified to the maximum for God’s sake” is to strive
for the highest nobility which men can attain.
Y/ieman does not say that there is no reward in such devotion.
Through adjustment to the process of integration man may attain the
highest possible values. The question is not whether that which man
attains is what man wants ; it is what man ought to have and what he
ought to be. This is to strive for that which is higher even than
man’s imagined ideals. The ennobling character of such a religion
is inestimable.
4. Jt, asserts the goodness of God. A view of God which did
not consider him as good would be unacceptable. This follows from
the definition of God, for a supreme power which is not good would
be a devil or the process of evil. This integrating process V/ieman
* See "Y/hat’s the ?/orld to Me.” In Henry Pitney Van Dusen,
Ventures in Belief . N.Y.: Scribner, 1930, pp. 105-107.
g
See ”A Conversation About God,” Christian Century . 49
(1932), 284.
3
Loc. cit
1t
*
holds to "be the dominant order of the universe. It is that which
is supremely valuable and that through which values may be attained.
To say that values are evil is to contradict the meaning of our
words. That which is valuable and maintains value must be good.
Wieman holds this process to be exclusive of evil. He claims that
God is not the whole of existence because God excludes evil. God
must therefore be good.
It would be contrary to fact to claim that the process of the
universe which brings the world and humanity into existence is evil.
Human beings experience value in the world as it is. The experi-
ences of good predominate over the experiences of evil. The devel-
opment of the world shows it to be progressive. This progress and
goodness are due to God, the integrating process at work in the uni-
verse.
1
That Wieman* s view maintains the goodness of God is thus
another argument in favor of this view.
5. It asserts the objectivity of value . A view of value which
is merely subjective does not reveal anything of the true nature of
value. What is the criterion of value if value is to be judged by
each person’s likes and dislikes? There must be some sort of valid
knowledge or some objective form of truth which all minds can expe-
rience. There is no standard of value unless we accept the objec-
tivity of value. Consequently, there could be no proof that human
beings experience value unless there was this objective standard by
-
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which value can he measured. Wieman*s view asserts the objectivity
of value; so that he may truthfully say that human beings experience
value. According to him "Value is objective; it is ’out there*
. . .
although it cannot be unrelated to human living any more than the
rest of the universe can be unrelated to human living." * Value is
a character of the universe. It cannot be unrelated to human beings
since they are a part of the universe. Furthermore, human beings,
being related to the universe^ could not experience value if it were
not inherent in the universe. A religion such as humanism does not
take care of the question of value. Wieman*s view, however, does
make the attainment of value for human beings logically possible.
We find that to be a value in his view.
B. Unfavorable.
1. This view contains formal defects in presentation . The
formal defects are by no means the most important objections to
Wieman*s view, but they are imposing enough to deserve mention.
They add, furthermore, to the difficulty of Wieman’s idea and make
his thought much more difficult to understand. We find two out-
standing formal defects in his presentation,
a. Jt_ _is at times inconsistent . There are several incon-
sistencies in Wieman*s view which make it difficult to understand
always what he means. Some of these affect Wieman*s whole concep-
tion; others, only parts of it, nevertheless, this lack of uni-
1 WET, 163.
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formity is significant in any effort to determine the truth or fal-
sity of his ideas.
It is difficult to discover, for instance, to what extent in
Wieman's view God controls the universe. At times Wieman represents
God as supreme and ultimate and at others as only one aspect of na-
ture. In Chapter X of The Wrestle of Religion with Truth God is
represented as the ultimate cause and as a substance common to all.
In Chapter XI of the same book God is referred to as "only one prin-
2
ciple in the universe.” There are many other principles besides
God. Again in the same chapter God is called "the inherent nature
of all being." We are informed that there are many orders of ex-
istence and possibility, and if there were an order which included
them all God could not "be identified with any such all-inclusive
4
order." In another place we are told that "underneath all other
facts is the basic fact on which all else depends. This basic fact
can be called the structure of the universe or it can be called
God." 5 Among these various and diverse definitions it is difficult
to say just how significant God is.
Some of the other inconsistencies are of less importance and
will be mentioned very briefly. We find two contradictory state-
1 WET, 172.
2 WET, 189.
Z WET, 185.
4 IOL, 163.
5 MPEL, 113-114.
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merits about the concreteness of God, "The objective concrete ex-
istence of the religious object is certainly known to those ac-
quainted with God," * Opposing this statement we find one to the
2
effect that "God is not himself concrete." It is true that Wie-
man has derived this statement from Whitehead, but Wieman shows
that he accepts the view as his own,
Y/ieman attributes the quality of goodness to God, It is hard
to see how that which is not mind can have goodness ascribed to it.
The quality of goodness depends upon the presence of a will which is
able to choose. Although God for Wieman is not a person, Wieman has
in one instance attributed a will to him. In an open letter on the
Macintosh case he says: "I hold that there is no other possible test
which any man can have of what the will of God may be save his own
interpretation of that will. , . " ® It may be unfair to criticize
Wieman on this point, as this letter was not intended to convey a
conception of God. But do his working philosophy and his theoreti-
cal philosophy differ? It may be that Wieman used the expression
"the will of God" as a symbol. Yet he definitely criticizes put-
ting "ancient content" into modern conceptions.4 To speak of the
will of God is to put ancient content into his idea.
1 BESM, 54.
2 WBT, 185.
5 Christian Century
. 48 (1931), 878.
4 See "A Conversation About God." Christian Century
. 49 (1932)
282, especially the section Man* a Noblest Need for God
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One startling statement is this: "Nature may very well "be
moved and sustained by the operation of a supreme mind or person-
ality." ^ Wieman discusses the problem no farther than to state
that such operation of mind may be possible. That is not what he
means by God, for he has made it plain in his writings that he does
not believe God to be a Supreme Mind. If there is such a mind we
wonder what it has to do with the process which he calls God.
Wieman is also inconsistent in his statements of the way in
which we know God. He states that we learn to know God in the same
way that we know anything else. There is no special organ through
which we may know God. Yet in the religious experience which he
describes all previous conceptions are broken down and there is no
2
"conceptualized cognition of these masses of experience." How,
then, does one know that one has experienced God? There is no
knowledge of anything else without cognition; and the idea that
there can be knowledge of God when there is no cognition during the
experience implies that God must be known in a way different from
that in which other things are known.
Moreover, this experience in which one is aware of the total-
ity of being need not be an experience of God, for God is not the
all. According to Wieman he is only one order of the universe.
1 EESM, 180
2 RESM, 37.
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How, then, shall one select from this experience that which is God? *
Another inconsistency is found in the statement that it is God
who reorganizes and causes the constantly changing forms and aspects
p
of nature. A process or a mechanism does not reorganize hut con-
tinues in the established order. It takes a thinking mind to reor-
ganize and form something new. However, Wieman, who accepts a more
mechanistic explanation, would not agree with us.
h. Its meaning is vague . In addition to being inconsistent
occasionally, Wieman is often vague. His definitions are the kind
which may mean almost anything, thus obscuring any one meaning which
may be implied. We quote one example: "God is this most subtle and
intimate complexity of environmental nature which yields the great-
25
est good when right adjustment is made." According to such a def-
inition God could be almost anything which one wanted to interpret
him to be. The definition of God as the value-making process or
4that which increases the value of existence is no more definite.
When we have added to these the "process of integration", the "prin-
ciple of concretion," "a constitutional tendency of the universe,"
"a cosmic process," and "that which is supremely significant for
* This argument is developed by Albert E. Hay in "Wieman’
s
Philosophy and Christianity." Methodist Review , 115 (1950), 687.
2
See WRT, 194.
3 WET, vi.
4 MPEL, 59.
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human living, " we still do not have a very comprehensible concept.
God is too unknown in such definitions to he of real value. Wie-
man*s terminology conceals God from us rather than revealing him
to us. A statement of Y/hitehead’s might well he used in criticism
of Wieman: "You cannot rise above the adequacy of the terms you em-
ploy."
1
Curiously enough, Wieman himself regards this vagueness as one
of the strong points of his view. He says: "God must be vaguely
2
specified but vividly symbolized." The reason God must be vaguely
specified is that "time and again these specifications will be
3
smashed." This seems like a purposive evasion of clearness in an
effort to avoid being distinctly mistaken. If Mr. Wieman wishes to
put religion on a scientific basis, he must not be afraid of being
specific. Science has erred many times, corrected its mistakes, and
gone on. Science has been positively definite, and for this very
reason has won faith and popularity. To make the idea of God so
vague that it cannot be defined is to put it where it can never be
tested scientifically. Thus, when 7/ieman clothes the idea of God in
vague terminology, he defeats his purpose of putting religion on a
scientific plane.
1
A. U. Whitehead, HIM, 131.
2
"Criticism and Devotion." An address given by Dr. Wieman
at Harvard University, March 29, 1932.
3
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2. It. lessens the significance of the word. God. Although
Yfieman has done much in attempting to put religion on a level with
science he has done so at the sacrifice of the meaning of the word
God. He has tried to make his definition so demonstrable that he
has subtracted vitally from its meaning. Everyone, even an atheist,
would have to admit that there is such a process in the world as
Wieman describes. Thus, he proves the existence of God by his def-
inition! However, to take a certain definite process in nature and
to call that process God is not to prove the existence of God in the
real meaning of the word. Wieman is careful to show that God is only
one of the processes of nature. "God,” he says, "is not the uni-
verse.
. .
But God is one constitutional tendency of the universe." *
2
God is one order of nature according to Wieman’ s definition and
that is not an all-inclusive order. It is true that he says that
this order is the dominant order of the universe, but there seem to
be others with tendencies equally well defined. Such reduction of
God, making him a part of the activity of nature, simply makes God
a portion of another greater process. We cannot find the Ultimate
Reality by transposing the word God so that it means a part of the
process of nature. That would make even nature greater than God
and still leaves us wondering as to the cause of nature. This view
also involves metaphysical problems because of its lack of unity.
^
"A Workable Idea of God." Religious Education , 23 (1928),
965.
2
IOL, 249
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5. J/t contains metaphysical difficulties .
a, Its pluralism fails to explain the unity of reality .
We must distinguish here what we mean by pluralism. The difficulty
of Wieman’s theory lies not in its quantitative pluralism (as ac-
cepted by personalism), but in its pluralistic theism. Wieman does
not claim that there is more than one deity, but he does claim that
God is not the only process in the universe. He says that there are
many subordinate principles, and "above all, there is the principle
of evil which is antagonistic to the concreting principle."
1
If
the other principles of the universe are subordinate, we find the
principle of evil on an almost equal plane. He does not say or sug-
gest that evil will triumph, but he gives us almost a dualism of an-
tagonistic forces. At other times Wieman stresses the fact that
there are many processes at work in the universe and that God is on-
ly one of them.
How then is it possible to explain the unity of the universe?
How can one explain the relation and interaction of the various
processes? If science is valid, there must be interaction in re-
ality. If reality is many, if there are many apparently independ-
ent processes, how do they work in such harmony as to produce a uni-
verse? Either there must be one reality back of the whole or no in-
teraction between the parts. Mr. Wieman would probably not recog-
nize this criticism, for he believes that there are many existent
1 WRT
,
189
..
. ,
.
,
,
.
,
,
- . ; 3. ,ir>niT
.
.
,
,
,
i.i
C
73
orders in the universe and that it is doubtful if they could he re-
duced to one all-inclusive order. ^ However, he fails to explain
how all these orders work in one universe and happen to he related
to each other. Thus Wieman’s theory of God as one of the processes
of nature leaves unexplained the basic unity of reality.
b. Its mechanism fails to account for purpose . The thought
of God as only a process or an order is necessarily mechanistic.
Since a process can have no purpose (except unconscious purpose,
which, as Sorley points out, is meaningless 2 ), Wieman f s theory
must contain some elements of mechanism. Mechanism would explain
the facts of existence hy the sequence of parts and events. Wieman
does this hy saying that each part of existence is what it is be-
cause of its relation to the rest of existence. There is in the
world a principle of concretion which draws all being into each part
of being. The problem is. How does this principle explain the appar-
ent purpose in the universe? The world seems to be moving toward a
goal, constantly improving its "c oneret ions.” A mechanical process
is not sufficient to explain purpose in the universe. It is also
impossible in such a theory to account for purpose as it is experi-
enced by human beings. A non-purposeful process cannot account for
purpose in its products. Rather is purpose that which produces proc-
ess and order. A mechanistic theory fails to explain novelties and
the origin of species which survive. If human beings are produced
1 See IOL, 163.
2 W. R. Sorley, WIG, 400-422
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lay interaction, they are what this interaction determines them to
he, and hence have no freedom of choice. Indeed it would he use-
less, if this were true, for Y/ieman to explain his theory of God,
for all persons would believe from necessity what they believed.
Wieman does, however, believe in the freedom of personality; but
this belief is not the logical outcome of his theory unless the
process of integration is not the dominating process in the universe.
e • I'fcg "near behaviorism" does not explain the facts of con-
sciousness . Wieman is almost behavioristic in his view of the devel-
opment of personality. This view he sums up in these words: "When
the organism in its interaction with the environment develops sym-
bols and begins to communicate, it becomes a personality." * Ac-
cording to Wieman personality develops because of its reaction to
its environment, including other persons. This fails to tell us
what there is in personality which makes it capable of development,
capable of making symbols and of infusing meaning into those symbols.
This "near behaviorism" explains the mental in terms of the interac-
tion of the physical. This is a way of seeking to explain the con-
scious by means of the nonconscious. But the interpretation of this
interaction into thought is not physical, but mental. Personality
is more than the interaction of physical forces and cannot be ex-
plained by a process of interaction alone. Consciousness defies ex-
planation in terms of unconsciousness. What is it that makes the
1 IOL, 210
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person aware, plastic, and responsive, capable of using symbols to
express abstract ideas? There is capacity to develop through in-
teraction, but this capacity is not caused by interaction. Wie-
man’s view, therefore, does not account adequately for personality.
This tendency toward behaviorism leads Wieman to treat God as
one of the kinds of behavior in the universe. The universe has in
it a process which promotes integrations. That is one of the tend-
encies of the cosmos. Wieman* s behavioristic approach limits the
idea of God until it becomes a name for a phase of God’s activity.
4* It, does not account for the objectivity of value . Wieman
asserts that value is objective, but his idea of value is so ab-
stract as to lose all meaning. He gives this illustration to show
the meaning of the objectivity of value: * Breathing is a value,
but it is by no means merely a human or organic process. The air is
active in breathing, and without it breathing would be impossible.
There is, however, much more involved. The sun and the earth are
both active in this process. The earth’s whole activity is depend-
ent on the energy received from the sun, and it is because of the
earth that the air presses down in the proper density required for
breathing. Thus these factors and many others enter into the
breathing process. All of these are related to human living, and
therefore value is inherent in them. "Value is inherent in the to-
tality of all being because that totality is inherently related to
1 WET, 162-165
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human living. "
1
We agree that value is inherent in the universe, not only be-
cause it is related to human life, but because there is a Supreme
2
Mind of which values are the "normative appreciations." ^ With-
out a mind there is no standard or norm by which a value may be
judged. The statement that something is a value requires a judg-
ment of which only a mind is capable. What is a value which as
Wieman says is "out there"? Suppose we should say that sunlight is
valuable for the plant. Does not that very statement imply a mind
which makes a judgment as to what is valuable for the plant? Even
if we say that the plant would die without sunlight, we are making
a judgment that life is valuable. Value simply cannot be thought
without the idea of a mind to judge what is valuable. There is no
abstract beauty apart from a mind for which a given object is beauti-
ful. There is no morality except for a mind which can judge what is
moral or immoral. There is no thought without a thinker or religion
apart from a religious person. Thus, anything which may be of value
implies a value judgment. Value, then, can be objective only when
1 WET, 162.
2 This is a dogmatic statement, since no proof has been of-
fered for such an assertion. It is not the purpose of this thesis
to prove the existence of a Supreme Mind, but it is the purpose to
show here that objectivity of value is nothing apart from aruch a
mind. The statement that there is a Supreme Mind is not offered as
proof of this objectivity.
3
Edgar S. Brightman, ITP, 165*
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values are arranged in a coherent system inhering in a Supreme
Mind* This Supreme Mind gives values a norm whereby human stand-
ards of value may he judged. Thus Wieman* s view does not prove the
objectivity of value because value in his sense is a mere abstraction.
5. JEt does not deal adequately with the problem of evil . An-
other difficulty of Wieman* s view is that it fails to explain the
origin and source of evil. We know from his explanation that evil
is, that it is the destroyer of concretions or of the good, and that
it is one of the principles of the universe. It is certainly not a
dominating principle (according to this view), because it is a para-
site on goodness, or on God. God, however, holds Wieman, is entire-
ly exclusive of this process. Wieman does not explain where evil
came from or how it came into being. We do not know if evil is a
product of nature or if it is an independent process capable of
self-direction as is the process of good. There is simply no ac-
count in Wieman *s explanation of the source of evil. Since V/ieman
calls it one of the principles of the universe, the implication is
that evil is self-causative. If that is the case we have again the
difficulties of pluralism. The question then is. How do the proc-
esses happen to be related to each other in the same universe?
An illustration of Dr. Brightman*s brings out this point spe-
cifically. The sun, which is so necessary to all the life and proc-
esses of the earth, makes life on this planet possible and at the
same time causes death by sunstroke. The causing of death is cer-
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tainly an evil and a process of anti-concretion, for the noblest
concretion, man, is broken down; yet the sun has helped to make
^01 those concretions possible. How then do the process of evil and
the order of good work together at the same time in the same sun?
Wieman* s view offers no way of accounting for the underlying unity
involved in the fact that they do work together in accordance with
the same laws,
Wieman is not specific as to the nature of evil; he explains
it simply as that which tends to break down concreteness. * Is e-
vil, then, natural evil, moral evil, or both? Wieman states that
2 5
moral wickedness is evil and that suffering is evil; further,
4
evil is "frustration of the most inclusive interest." The out-
come of the problem, we believe, is satisfactorily solved. Evil
may be transmuted so that it serves the cause of good. In person-
al correspondence with Albert Edv/ard Day, Wieman writes: "I believe
there is evidence to Indicate that God and the good will prevail.
But I doubt that the time will ever come when there is nothing more
to be done to improve things and that all we can do is to sit down
in absolute passivity," This solution we find adequate; it is the
lack of explanation of the origin and source of evil, and the dual-
' ism involved in Wieman’ s view which make his treatment of evil in-
adequate.
*
1 WRT
,
189.
2 WET, 200.
s WET, 164.
4 WET, 163.
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6. rt fails to account for the origin of the physical uni-
verse or of persons . Wieman’s view takes into consideration only
a part of reality. He accounts for the action of the universe with-
out giving an account of its origin. What was the cause which
brought this orderly, integrated world into existence? Even in ad-
mitting the process of integration to account for the orderliness,
we need to go hack still farther. The part of reality which organ-
izes in such a manner as to give abstract forms "maximum entrance"
into each part of being is understandable as a part of the action of
reality; but how can we account for the abstract forms and parts of
living which are used in making concretions? There must be some re-
ality or cause back of this principle of concretion or integrating
process.
The same argument holds for the origin of persons. How did
life as a possibility enter the universe? The process of inter-
action may have been responsible for the development of life, but
there must have been some inherent potential power which made it ca-
pable of development. We must have a further account of reality
than Wieman’s idea of God to explain the origin of the physical uni-
verse and of human life. His view implies self-explanation, which
places us again in the difficulties of mechanism.
^
7. It, gives an inadequate account of the personal life .
a. JLk to recognize the worth of individual person-
ality
.
The tendency toward behavioristic explanation naturally
T Cf. above, pp. 73-74
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leads toward a disparagement of personality. Since personality is
considered as caused by forces outside it, it becomes less impor-
tant than these external forces. For V/ieman society is one of these
forces and therefore higher in rank than the individuals which com-
pose it. He apparently forgets that society is nothing without its
individual members, which are personalities. If there were nothing
in individual personalities which caused them to take that which they
find in society, and with the action of their own reasoning capaci-
ties form something new, society would still be in its original prim-
itive state.
Wieman does not wish to attribute personality to God because
of the limitations of personality. It is true that human personal-
ity is limited because of its dependence on a physical body, but
that is not the chief or determinative characteristic of personal-
ity. Dean Knudson says: ”We would find in personality four.
. ,
fundamental elements: first, Individuality, which includes unity
and identity; second, self-consciousness in the sense of the po?/er
to know as well as to feel; third, will or free activity; and fourth,
dignity or worth. " ^ Dr. Marlatt’s list of the qualities of per-
sonality will add to our conception. A person is continuous (has
identity), is complex (has changing ideas, feelings, and volitions),
is separate (a unique individuality), is social, is causative, is
rational ("a machine plus a machinist”), and is organic (a whole
* Albert C. Knudson, PP, 83.
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greater than the sum of its parts), 1 We see here that which Wie-
man does not recognize: that personality is itself causative and
capable to some extent of controlling its own environment. There
is present an active autonomous will which frequently masters sit-
uations and events instead of being completely controlled by them.
When we recognize these qualities of personality we do not hesitate
to attribute them to God. Personality, being causative, can create
order and machine-like processes. It can furthermore account for
novelty and change which are unaccountable in a mechanistic view.
It is quite a reversal of procedure to say that the machine causes
the man; yet this is what Wieman does. More reasonable is the idea
that this process or order which causes interactions and integra-
tions is a part of the energizing of the active will of a Supreme
Mind.
b. _It offers no treatment of the problem of immortality.
The idea of the worth of personality cannot be completely thought
through without belief in immortality. However, Wieman does not
ascribe great worth to personality and therefore does not mention
belief in immortality. On the other hand, he seems to think that
the most noble course of action is to pass from the urge of life to
the art of life. In other words, we should live under the Mlure of
2
unexplored possibilities. " The art of life is to cultivate an
^ Cf. Earl Marlatt, What Is a Person? Bulletin, Boston Uni-
versity School of Religious Education and Social Service, 1925.
2
IOL, 12.
,1 »
,
,
.
,
, ,
.
82
attitude of devotion and search for the "utmost possibilities of
value which the present state of existence may yield." 1
This, it must he admitted, is very significant for the pres-
ent life. The time must come, however, when life on this planet
must end. 7/hat, then, will become of the values we have striven so
hard to attain, the higher society which we have tried to pass on
to humanity? Without belief in the conservation of values in human
personalities our struggle for value becomes practically and ulti-
mately futile. Is it not irrational to follow a movement toward the
art of life without knowing where it will lead us? "Unexplored pos-
sibilities" are vague divinities to follow. Blind devotion to an un-
known goal will not necessarily lead to the true art of life. Belief
in the conservation of values through the permanence of personality
will encourage the development of the art of life as an aspect of the
maintenance and increase of value. Such belief avoids the pitfalls
of blind devotion because it knows "where it is going."
It is true that we should not argue for immortality unless
our view of reality offers grounds for such a belief. The belief
in immortality must rest largely upon belief in a good God who would
not destroy value. Immortality is necessary for the conservation of
value, since value is nothing apart from persons. If objectivity of
value is real there must be a personal God in whom this value is in-
herent. God, who conserves value, could not destroy persons because
1 IOL, 252
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they are themselves valuable*
Wieman is logical in so far as he does not, with his view of
God, maintain belief in immortality* On a mechanistic basis belief
in immortality is impossible. However, Wieman is inconsistent when
he maintains the objectivity of value along with belief in an imper-
sonal God. Furthermore, unless one believes in immortality belief
in the conservation of value is logically impossible, for if persons
are destroyed, value will ultimately be destroyed.
c. It. gives an unsatisfactory view of prayer . When person-
ality is denied to God prayer becomes mere aspiration. Prayer, ac-
cording to Webster, is "the offering of adoration, confession, sup-
plication, thanksgiving, etc. to the Supreme Being." If there is
no Supreme Being there can be no prayer. The kind of God which Wie-
man describes is capable of no response to or fulfillment of prayer.
The only kind of attitude which one could take toward a process
would be that of cooperating with it in order to avoid being de-
stroyed. Prayer consists in the willingness to cooperate with God
and the belief that God will cooperate with man. There is no such
thing as unconscious cooperation. Therefore, if God is not a per-
sonality there can be no response to prayer, although man can coOp-
erate with such a God.
Wieman believes that prayer which persuades God to do things
is futile and foolish. Prayer for him is an attitude of the per-
sonality "deliberately directed to that order which is God to the
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end of "bringing about some good thing,”
1
In such a prayer man en-
deavors to fit his personality into the integrating process so that
the greatest good may he produced, Wieman gives five steps in wor-
ship through which man may mate this adjustment: (1) Contemplation
or awareness of the sustaining process; (2) contemplation of the
vast and unimaginable possibilities for good; (3) consideration of
one’s own problems; (4) discovery of the changes necessary in one’s
attitudes and habits; and (5) formulation of the necessary readjust-
2
ment of behavior as clearly as possible in words. That is the act
of worship and it is also prayer.
This sort of attitude of the religious person, while extremely
important, is not prayer. It is based on no hope of coBperation
from God except as the processes already established may help.
Prayer calls on God to take an attitude toward the individual. The
answer to prayer may, and does, come in accordance with the laws of
nature; but the laws of nature for personality allow for much change
and influence by other personalities. Belief in the validity of
prayer is faith that God will answer prayer and respond to the in-
dividual. It is mutual coBperation between man and God, In the
"worshipful problem solving” of which Wieman speaks there is only
coBperation of the human being with a process, Man can do much to
1 IOL, 231.
2 This is an abridgment of the stages given by Wieman, MPEL, 30-35.
^ This view has been developed by Edgar S. Brightman in a class
lecture in his course on "Beligious Values,” March 3, 1932.
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change his character hy such worship, but there is no mutual rela-
tionship, There is simply high aspiration combined with autosug-
gestion and determining will.
Prayer is offered with the belief that it will make a dif-
ference to God. The kind of prayer which Wieman speaks of depends
on the individual and the processes of nature. His attitude may
change other individuals so that the process of interaction works
for the good. That, however, is the work of the individual; he is
responsible for the change, not the process which Wieman calls God,
Consequently, the prayer which Wieman describes is not prayer but
action of the human will and its effect on other wills.
8. ^3 values are included in personalism . To show that the
values of Wieraan's view are contained in personalism, we shall sum
up as briefly as possible the personalistic conception. Personal-
ism is the philosophy which holds that only persons are real. Ul-
timate reality consists of many persons maintained by a perfect Su-
preme Person, All matter is of the nature of mind, and physical
things, including the cosmos as a whole, are products of the will
of the Supreme Being. God is immanent in the world in so far as
he is present in all physical conditions, but transcendent in that
he is more than the universe and not exhausted by it. He has also
created wills other than his own which are themselves free and caus-
ative.
How are the values of Wieman' s view contained in such a phi-

losophy as personalism? (1) We have shown that Wieman fails to
make religion scientifically demonstrable by virtue of the fact
that he subtracts from the meaning of God. Personalism gives a
definition of God which, while not demonstrable by science, can
be philosophically explained without conflicting statements.
There is at least as much demonstrable truth in personalism as in
Wieman’s view, (2) Personalism is also theocentric in that God
is the central figure and is defined as nearly as possible in re-
lation to the whole of truth. (3) Personalism requires the high-
est nobility to be devoted to a personal God. There is mutuality
here which is not found in Wieman’s view. Personalism demands the
virtue of reasonableness. There is mutual relationship between
intelligent human beings and a rational God, and on the part of
the former a striving after rational ends instead of a following,
in blind devotion, of unknown possibilities. Personalists accept
the obligation to be rational without which devotion in the high-
est sense is impossible. (4) This view asserts the goodness of
God, and (5) the objectivity of value, which rests in the value
judgments of a Supreme Being,
Thus, personalism contains the values of Wieman’ s view and
avoids the difficulties to which the latter is exposed. A satis-
factory concept of God explains all the parts of reality and re-
lates them to each other in a coherent whole. Wieman’ s view does
not account for the whole of reality, but only for a part of it.
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Is not a view which does not have this incompleteness more desir-
able and more nearly true?
C. Concluding Femarks.
In giving his view of God Wieman has been more scientific
than philosophical. Considered as a philosophy Wieman* s concep-
tion involves contradictions. When it is treated as a view of the
whole of reality, unsolved problems arise. It is not, therefore,
a philosophical view in the true sense of the term. Perhaps he
does not want it to be. He has insisted that religion be placed
on a par with science and tested according to scientific method.
The method of science is to take a portion of reality and analyze
it into its component parts. Science as such is not concerned
with relating its findings to the whole of reality. In this re-
spect Wieman is scientific. The facts of science are valid for a
certain area of experience; Wieman believes his view to be valid
for religious experience, and to a certain extent it is. One
could accept his view of God and religion and find in it the im-
pulse to a noble life. The question is. Would it be the be3t life
one could lead? A more comprehensive vi ew is better qualified to
lead one toward the truth. Is not a person who accepts the broad-
er view more capable of guiding his life toward the highest possi-
bility of value?
..
, t
,
.
,
,
-
,
,
Chapter VII
SUMMARY
A. Summary of Wieman’s Concept of God.
Y/ieman says first of all that we know God through religious
experience, but that we must test this experience by the best meth
ods known to us. The experience of God is of value, for God is
that which has supreme value for all human living. Value is not
merely a human experience, but is inherent in the universe. Val-
ues can never be unrelated to human beings because everything is
related in some measure to human life.
God is not to be confused with the ideal after which men
strive. It is through God, the value-making process, that the i-
deal may be attained. Y/ieman does not attribute personality to
God because God is more than personality. He holds that person-
ality develops through interaction and through contact with the
environment. It would limit God too greatly to have such a con-
cept of him.
God, being the process through which value is attained, is
very closely related to human existence. He is that which is of
supreme value for all human beings. Man may attain the greatest
possibility of value through God, but it is only through complete
adjustment and yielding to this process that value can be attained
The attainment of value comes through experience of God. This ex-
perience is a means of tearing down habitual responses, thereby
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allowing the development of an entirely new form of response. In
the religions experience there is no direct cognition, "but an a-
wareness of the vast totality of "being. This experience enables
one to transform one’s life, even to the extent of remolding one’s
desires. This experience and all the experiences of life reveal
God to "be good. Though God is good, and though he is the dominant
principle of the universe, there are other principles, the chief of
which is the principle of evil. Evil is the destroyer of good, the
process of "anti-concretion," or the principle which destroys in-
tegrations.
God is related to humanity and to all of the universe. He
is the process through which mutuality and interaction occur.
Through this interaction the human being attains otherwise impos-
sible values. This process which gives value sustains all exist-
ence, for any form of being would be impossible were it not for
its coming into being as an integration. Even evil depends on
this process for evil is a parasite on it. This integrating proc-
ess brings all being in some degree of relevance into every part
of existence. It thus concretes existence or forms concretions.
This concreting principle makes possible the relation of all be-
ing to every part of existence.
God is present in the world as a process, but also transcends
the world in the form of possibility. All the possibilities which
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there are become possible because this process allows for change
and becoming. God is the ultimate cause, the underlying, stimu-
lating substance common to all. Although God is relevant to all
being in that there could be no existence without him, he is not
to be considered as the totality of all being, God is one par-
ticular structure of the universe, the structure which maintains
concretions and value. Above all, God is exclusive of evil, for
God is the developing process of the world and not the destroying
process.
B. Summary of Estimate of Wieman f s Concept.
One of the unique contributions which Wieman has to offer is
his attempt to place religion on a plane with science, so that it
will be equally demonstrable and as universally acceptable as
science. Another favorable element in Y/ieroan’s view is that it is
theocentric, that is, it is focused on objective truth rather than
on the desires of human beings. It regards God as the central fact
of the universe. Adherence to VtTieman’s view requires the highest
type of nobility because such acceptance demands devotion to a
cause other than one’s self. According to Wieman this devotion is
given not because of the reward which one hopes to attain, but be-
cause this is the only way of acquiring the "art" of life. Wie-
man’s conception asserts the goodness of God; a view which did not
do so would be unacceptable. Further, Wieman maintains the objec-
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tivity of value, and this makes logically possible the attainment
of value for human beings. There is no standard by which value
may be judged unless it is objective.
There are, however, difficulties as well as advantages in
Wieman’s view. It suffers from inconsistency and vagueness. The
many definitions of God leave us with a vague notion that God is
something of value for the world and human beings. This vagueness
helps to defeat Wieman’s purpose of putting religion on a scien-
tific plane. In the attempt to make religion scientific Y/ieman
has succeeded only by subtracting from the meaning of the word God,
God according to his definition is no more than a part of nature
or one of the processes of nature. Since God is not the only proc-
ess, this conception is open to all the difficulties of pluralistic
theism. The account of the process through which integrations are
formed and personality develops leads to a mechanistic and behavior-
istic explanation which does not account for purpose or conscious-
ness.
While Wieman holds to the objectivity of value he offers no
satisfactory explanation of it, for value is meaningless apart from
a mind which makes value-judgments. The objectivity of value has
meaning only in a universe in which the system of values is embod-
ied in a Supreme Being. Further, we find in this concept no ac-
count of the source of evil. Again, inasmuch as evil as well as
good is treated as a process, the view hardly escapes pluralism.
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Wi email’s failure to account for the origin of the physical universe
or of persons leaves us without a full account of reality. We are
almost forced to a mechanistic explanation which fails to account
for consciousness.
This view also fails to give an adequate account of the per-
sonal life. Wieman's near "behaviorism causes him to overlook the
worth of individual personality. His view has no place for immor-
tality and does not even mention it. This makes his view somewhat
inconsistent as the conservation of value is impossible without im-
mortality. His treatment of prayer is also inadequate. An imper-
sonal conception of God makes prayer an action only of the human
subject instead of an act of mutual cooperation in which God is a
partner. Finally, the values of Wieman’s impersonal ism are pre-
served in personalism, while the difficulties and inconsistencies
of the former are avoided by the latter.
In conclusion we should say that Wieman follows the scien-
tific method rather than the philosophical. He offers a valuable
guide for living, but does not present a view of reality as a
whole. A more comprehensive conception would not only be more
consistent in itself, but would also offer a more logical guide
toward the life of supreme value.
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